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Issues in Asbestos Litigation
Between 1940 and 1979, 27.5 million individuals were exposed to
asbestos while working in the United States.1 As a result of this expo-
sure, approximately 8,200 cancer deaths now occur annually.2 These
deaths have led to a flood of litigation. At least 16,000 asbestos-related
lawsuits have been filed in state and federal courts,3 and the case load
continues to expand.4 These actions constitute the largest, and poten-
tially most costly, block of products liability claims ever to confront
American industry.5
1. ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 5,176 (July 9, 1982). This is a maximum figure. Another
estimate is that 13.2 million individuals were exposed. Id. at 4,679 (Mar. 12, 1982).
2. Id. at 5,176 (July 9, 1982). The number of annual deaths due to asbestos-related
cancers will increase to approximately 9,700 by the year 2000. Id. The figures do not in-
clude deaths from asbestosis, another asbestos-related disease. See infra notes 15-19 & ac-
companying text.
One study has concluded that 2.15 million American workers will die of asbestos-re-
lated cancers (67,000 annual deaths, representing 13-17% of all cancers in the United States).
See NAT'L CANCER INST., NAT'L INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH SCI. & NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUP.
SAFETY AND HEALTH, ESTIMATES OF THE FRACTION OF CANCER INCIDENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES RELATED TO OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS (1978).
All but two of the co-contributors to the National Cancer Institute (NCI) study have
expressed doubts as to its correctness. ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 5,177 (July 9, 1982). The
study also has been seriously criticized by independent experts. See Doll & Peto, The Causes
of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates ofA voidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today,
66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191, 1240-41, 1305-08 (1981) (concluding that there is at least a
10-fold exaggeration in the NCI estimates of the cancer hazards of asbestos exposure).
Nevertheless, the NCI estimates continue to be widely cited by courts, legislators and
commentators. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1354
(E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982);Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation
Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2847 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1980) (statement of Sen. Gary Hart) [hereinafter cited as 1980
Hearings]; Comment, An Examination ofRecurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALB. L.
REV. 1307, 1308 n.4 (1982).
3. Winter, Asbestos Legal 'Tidal Wave' is Closing In, 68 A.B.A. J. 397, 397 (1982).
4. The Manville Corporation, the nation's largest manufacturer of asbestos products,
estimated that as of June 30, 1982, new suits against it were being filed at the rate of 425 a
month. A study commissioned by Manville estimated that the company ultimately could
face 52,000 suits. ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 5,397 (Aug. 27, 1982). Manville has filed a peti-
tion to reorganize under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, I I U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174
(Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 127-28 & accompanying text.
5. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1. Estimates of the amount of damages
involved in asbestos litigation have varied widely. See ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 4,616 (Feb.
26, 1982) ($39 billion to $74 billion over the next 25 years); Schechter, Untangling the Asbes-
tos Mess, 51 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 30, 31, 39 (Feb. 1982) ($24 billion involved
in suits already fied); Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139, 159 (1981) ($100 billion in-
volved in present and future suits); Vagley & Blanton, Aggregation of Claims: Liability for
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This Comment examines the adequacy, equity and efficiency of
existing systems for compensating victims of asbestos-related disease.
The health hazards associated with asbestos exposure are considered
first. Workers' compensation, tort compensation and the legislative re-
sponse then are considered in turn. This Comment concludes that ex-
isting systems of compensation are ineffective to deal with the asbestos
problem, and that a federal compensation law should be enacted.
Medical Aspects of Asbestos Exposure
Asbestos is the generic name given to several naturally occurring
fibrous mineral silicates.6 While asbestos has been known about and
used in small amounts for thousands of years, 7 the widespread use of
asbestos is a 20th-century phenomenon.8 Some 3,000 uses of asbestos
have been recorded. 9 Most of these uses are in the construction indus-
try, ' 0 and thus it is in that industry that most of the occupational expo-
sure to asbestos has occurred."'
Certain Illnesses with Long Latency Periods Before Manifestation, 16 FORUM 636, 647 (1981)
($9.3 billion to $25.6 billion from 1977 to 1995).
6. 1 ASBESTOS: PROPERTIES, APPLICATIONS, AND HAZARDS 1 (L. Michaels & S. Chis-
sick eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as L. Michaels & S. Chissick]. Currently, six silicates are
considered by industrial and governmental groups in various parts of the world to be asbes-
tos. These are crocidolite, amosite, anthophyllite, tremolite, actinolite, and chrysotile. Poo-
ley. Mineralogy of Asbestos." The Physical and Chemical Properties of the Dusts They Form, 8
SEMINARS IN ONCOL. 243, 243 (1981). Chrysotile is the most important type, accounting for
over 70% of the asbestos fiber used in the United States. CHEST MEDICINE 379 (R. George,
R. Light & R. Matthay eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as R. George, R. Light & R. Matthay].
Crocidolite is the most pathogenic type. See infra note 131 & accompanying text.
7. Anthophyllite was used in Finland to make clay pots 4000 years ago. Charlemagne
is said to have possessed a tablecloth made of asbestos and Marco Polo was shown the
substance in his travels in Siberia. Pliny (A.D. 50) mentioned that the weavers producing
wicks for the lamps of the vestal virgins wore masks to avoid inhaling asbestos dust. J.
CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, RESPIRATORY DISEASES 589 (3d ed. 1981); D. HUNTER, THE DIS-
EASES OF OCCUPATIONS 990 (6th ed. 1978); W. MORGAN & A. SEATON, OCCUPATIONAL
LUNG DISEASES 124 (1975).
8. The commercial mining of asbestos did not begin until 1879 in Quebec. Since then
use has increased dramatically. Worldwide use of asbestos has increased eight-fold in the
last 30 years and 1000-fold in the last 60 years. J. CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, supra note 7, at
589.
9. L. Michaels & S. Chissick, supra note 6, at 2.
10. The physical properties that make asbestos invaluable are fire resistance; poor con-
duction of heat and sound; the facility with which chrysotile, and to a lesser extent crocido-
lite, can be woven into fabrics; resistance to acids and chemicals (except for chrysotile);
electrical resistance; and mechanical strength. W. PARKES, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISOR-
DERS 235 (2d ed. 1982). There is no substitute for asbestos in many products. Id. at 236.
11. For example, before the hazards of asbestos were known, asbestos was widely used
in insulation products. Insulation workers were exposed to asbestos dust caused by cutting
or sawing the insulation to obtain a proper fit. During the last few years the use of asbestos
for new insulation has been virtually abandoned. There is, however, still a vast amount of
old asbestos insulation in place, the replacement or repair of which can be extremely hazard-
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Three primary health hazards have been associated with asbestos
exposure: lung cancer, asbestosis, and mesothelioma. At least seven-
teen major studies conducted since 1955 have confirmed the relation-
ship between asbestos exposure and an increase in lung cancer,' 2 but
the best evidence suggests that this increase only occurs in asbestos
workers who smoke. 13 Lung cancer is virtually incurable. 14
Asbestosis is a pulmonary fibrosis (an increase in fibrous tissue in
the lungs).' 5 Some studies suggest that seven to ten percent of workers
ous. R. George, R. Light & R. Matthay, supra note 6, at 380; H. HINSHAW & J. MURRAY,
DISEASES OF THE CHEST 723-24 (4th ed. 1980).
Exposure to asbestos in other industries has been less significant. For example, in the
United States in 1972 only 541 individuals were employed in all known active asbestos
mines and mills. L. PREGER, ASBESTos-RELATED DISEASE 3 (1978).
Exposure to asbestos also has occurred in less direct ways. The spouses of asbestos
workers were exposed when they washed the workers' clothes, and families merely living in
the vicinity of an asbestos mine, processing factory, shipyard or other large commercial user
may have been exposed. Newhouse, Epidemiology ofAsbestos-Related Tumors, in 8 SEMI-
NARS IN ONCOL. 250,253 (1981). Death and disability have resulted from this indirect expo-
sure. See infra note 235.
12. Becklake, Asbestos-Related Diseases of the Lungs and Pleura, 126 AM. REV. REsP.
Dis. 187, 188 (1982). While asbestos can cause lung cancer, there is conflicting evidence as
to whether or not asbestos also causes other cancers. Some studies suggest that individuals
heavily exposed to asbestos in the past are about twice as likely to die of gastro-intestinal
cancers (including cancers of the esophagus, stomach, and colon) as individuals not so ex-
posed, and that eight to nine percent of asbestos-exposed individuals die of these cancers.
See Occupational Diseases and Their Compensation (pt. 1, Asbestosis-Related Diseases):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1979) (statement of Dr. David P. Rail) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Hearings]. However, an increased prevalence of gastro-intestinal cancer has not been a
uniform finding in all studies. W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 295; L. PREGER, supra note 11,
at 6; Craighead & Mossman, The Pathogenesis ofAsbestos-Related Diseases, 306 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1446, 1452 (1982).
Similarly, the relationship between exposure to asbestos and subsequent pancreatic can-
cer is disputed. Compare Selikoff & Seidman, Cancer of the PancreasAmongAsbestos Insu-
lation Workers, 47 CANCER 1469 (1981) (finding little or no relationship) with Baptist v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 137 Cal. App. 3d 903, 187 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1982) (annulling
denial of compensation benefits for pancreatic cancer developed subsequent to asbestos
exposure).
13. See infra note 135.
14. 1979 Hearings, supra note 12, at 49 (statement of Dr. Anthony Robbins).
15. Fibrosis occurs in the lung when asbestos fibers and alveolar macrophages (scaven-
ger cells) accumulate in the alveoli, and are subsequently entrapped. This fibrosis later
spreads down to affect the terminal air sacs and more peripheral alveoli, so that finally
individual lesions link up to form a widespread fine fibrotic network in the lung. J.
CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, supra note 7, at 593; I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND Dis-
EASE 145-46 (1978).
Symptoms of asbestosis include steadily increasing breathlessness, dry cough (in the
later stages of most cases), rales (crackling sounds which may be heard in the lungs), and
clubbing of fingers and toes (of varying severity in approximately half the cases of more
advanced asbestosis). W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 255-56.
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exposed to asbestos contract asbestosis.16 However, this percentage var-
ies between studies, and it has been as high as one hundred percent for
workers exposed to asbestos for more than ten years. 17 The most im-
portant variable determining the incidence of asbestosis among various
populations is the product of the level and duration of asbestos expo-
sure experienced by the workers. 18 Asbestosis is frequently fatal. 19
Malignant mesothelioma is a tumor arising from the mesothelial
cells in the chest, stomach and heart.20 Some studies suggest that seven
to ten percent of workers exposed to asbestos contract mesothelioma. 21
However, the incidence of mesothelioma varies widely according to the
groups of workers studied. Insulation workers and shipyard employees
run the highest risk.22 Mesothelioma is dose-related 23 and is uniformly
fatal.24
16. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 12, at 71 (statement of Dr. Richard Lemen).
17. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 15, at 222.
18. W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 253.
19. G. CROMPTON, DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT OF RESPIRATORY DISEASES 182
(1980). No specific treatment for asbestosis has been developed. M. WHITCOMB, THE
LUNG: NORMAL AND DISEASED 174 (1982). In most cases the disease progresses even after
the individual has been removed from exposure to asbestos dust. However, there is some
evidence to suggest that removal from exposure after early detection of asbestosis may pre-
vent progression to a more advanced stage of the disease. W. MORGAN & A. SEATON, supra
note 7, at 128; W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 268; I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 15, at
234.
20. Suzuki, Pathology of Human Malignant Mesothelioma, 8 SEMINARS IN ONCOL. 268,
268 (1981). Mesothelioma is much more likely to occur in the chest (pleura) than in the
stomach (peritoneum), and it is very unlikely to occur in the heart. 1d. Symptoms of pleural
mesothelioma include steadily increasing chest pain and breathlessness, and loss of appetite
and weight. Symptoms of peritoneal mesothelioma include abdominal discomfort and
swelling, lethargy and weakness. W. MORGAN & A. SEATON, supra note 7, at 363-64.
21. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 12, at 80 (statement of Dr. David P. Rail). An inci-
dence of 7-10% percent means that at least 10,000 mesotheliomas per year should be occur-
ring already. However, the actual number is less than 1,000 a year. Doll & Peto, supra note
2, at 1307-08.
22. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 15, at 294.
23. W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 286; Whitwell, Scott & Grimshaw, Relationship Be-
tween Occupations and Asbestos Fiber Content of the Lungs in Patients with Pleural Mesothe-
lioma, Lung Cancer and Other Diseases, 32 THORAX 377, 383 (1977). But see H. HINSHAW &
J. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 731; A. KATZENSTEIN & F. ASKIN, SURGICAL PATHOLOGY OF
NON-NEOPLASTIC LUNG DISEASE 92 (1982).
24. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 15, at 302. Fifty percent of patients with pleural
mesothelioma are dead within 12 months of diagnosis, and very few survive more than two
years. The prognosis for patients with peritoneal mesothelioma is even worse. W. MORGAN
& A. SEATON, supra note 7, at 364. The course of the disease is not affected by radiotherapy,
drugs or attempts at resection. J. CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, supra note 7, at 595. Indeed,
there is some evidence to suggest that radiotherapy and drugs may encourage the tumor to
spread. W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 293. But see Brady, Mesothelioma-The Rolefor Radia-
tion Therapy, 8 SEMINARS IN ONCOL. 329, 332-33 (1981).
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Workers' Compensation
The primary vehicle for compensating the victims of occupational
disease is workers' compensation.25 Asbestosis has been a recognized
compensable disease under some workers' compensation programs
since the early 1930's,26 and today all states cover the disease.2 7 Cover-
age of mesothelioma and lung cancer has been less frequent. Twenty-
one states limit compensation for occupational diseases to those "pecu-
liar to" or "characteristic of" a worker's occupation. 28 Mesothelioma is
not peculiar to occupational exposure to asbestos, since no contact with
asbestos can be traced in fifteen percent of patients with the disease.2 9
Lung cancer is even less unique to the asbestos industry than is
mesothelioma.30 Because pathologists cannot determine whether a
given tumor was caused by asbestos rather than by cigarette smoke,3'
few asbestos workers have received workers' compensation for lung
cancer.
32
Even when the various asbestos-related diseases are covered by
25. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 921
(1980). Workers' compensation is a mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits and medi-
cal care to victims of work-related injuries. The typical workers' compensation act has these
basic features: (I) an employee is automatically entitled to benefits whenever he suffers a
personal injury by accident or disease arising out of and in the course of employment; (2) in
exchange for this automatic entitlement, an employee gives up his right to sue the employer
for damages for any injuries covered by the act; and (3) the employer is required to secure
his liability through private insurance, state-fund insurance, or self-insurance. See 1 A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1.10 (1978).
26. Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860, 869-70
(1980).
27. Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982." Hearings on H.K 5735
Before the Subcommr on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 500 (1982) (statement of Robin Obetz, Chairman, U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce Council on Workers' Compensation) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings].
28. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES 68-69 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
29. W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 277. See also infra note 233. In some studies, the
incidence of mesothelioma that is unrelated to asbestos exposure is as high as 80%. As a
general rule, however, the more intensive the inquiry into possible asbestos exposure and the
more thorough and quantitative the examination of lung tissue for asbestos, the fewer are
the non-associated cases. Kannerstein, Churg, McCaughey & Selikoff, Pathogenic Effects of
Asbestos, 101 ARCHIVES PATHOL. & LABORATORY MED. 623, 625 (1977). Thus, the few
courts ruling on the issue have found mesothelioma to be a compensable occupational dis-
ease. See Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Osteen
v. A. C. & S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 286, 307 N.W.2d 514, 518 (1981).
30. R. George, R. Light & R. Matthay, supra note 6, at 394.
3 1. Churg, Fiber Counting andAnalysis in the Diagnosis ofAsbestos-Related Disease, 13
HUMAN PATHOL. 381, 381 (1982).
32. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 28, at 15. But see Utter v. Asten-Hill Mfg. Co.,
453 Pa. 401, 309 A.2d 583 (1973); Celotex Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 70 Pa.
Commw. 407, 453 A.2d 373 (1982); Powell v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 273 S.E.2d
832 (W. Va. 1980).
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statute or judicial decision, actual recovery may be precluded by one or
more artifical barriers. Perhaps the most important restriction, present
in many state compensation statutes, is the requirement that a claim be
filed within a specified period of time after the last day of work or the
last exposure to the injurious substance.33 This requirement may oper-
ate to bar claims for asbestos-related disease, because the specified pe-
riod (often two to five years) is much shorter than the average latency
periods for these diseases (two to four decades).34
Another barrier is the requirement that claimants with asbestosis
prove that they have been exposed to the hazard in question for a sub-
stantial period of time, typically five years.35 In many cases this rule
will operate equitably, since symptoms of asbestosis usually do not ap-
pear until the individual has been exposed to asbestos dust for at least
ten years.36 But a heavy exposure to free asbestos fibers may lead to
the development of symptoms in a much shorter period of time. Heavy
exposure for one year has caused asbestosis, 37 and a mere eighteen
months of exposure has caused death from the disease.38 In these cases
the minimum exposure rule would preclude recovery.
39
33. While a majority of state workers' compensation laws contain statutes of limitations
that do not begin to run until the diseased person or the dependent knew or should have
known of the existence of the disease and its relationship to employment, a significant
number have retained the last-injurious-exposure rule. See P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 124 (1980) (of 40 state
workers' compensation statutes, only 26 use some type of discovery rule); Bunker v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co., 441 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. 1982) (last-injurious-exposure rule held constitu-
tional in asbestosis case); Stone v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 57 Or. App. 808, 646 P.2d
668 (1982) (also upholding constitutionality of last-injurious-exposure rule). But see Ryden
v. Johns-Manville Prod., 518 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (under Pennsylvania law, mani-
festation or discovery rule applies to asbestos-related diseases); Nelson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 120 Ariz. 278, 585 P.2d 887 (1978) (discovery rule applied in asbestosis case).
A related problem concerns the requirement in most jurisdictions that notice of a claim
must be given to an employer within a short period of time after the claim accrues. Courts
often hold that the time for giving notice does not begin to run until the employee has been
informed of the diagnosis of his asbestos-related disease. See Culp Indus. Insulation v.
Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 57 Pa. Commw. 599, 426 A.2d 1263 (1981); Aston-Hill Mfg.
Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 56 Pa. Commw. 20, 423 A.2d 1135 (1981); Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co. v. Luker, 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
34. See, e.g., Weldon v. Celotex Corp., 695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pennn-
sylvania law); McLain v. GAF Corp., 424 So. 2d 1329 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); EHer v. Porter-
Hayden Co., 48 N.C. App. 610, 269 S.E.2d 284 (1980); Brantley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 536
S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Smith & Channon, The Rising Storm, 17 FORUM 139, 142
n.18 (1981).
35. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 33, at 121.
36. M. WHITCOMB, supra note 19, at 172.
37. T. CLARK, CLINICAL INVESTIGATION OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE 472 (1981). Simi-
larly, even workers exposed to asbestos for less than six months run an elevated risk of
developing lung cancer. R. George, R. Light & R. Matthay, supra note 6, at 394.
38. D. HUNTER, supra note 7, at 999.
39. Several states also impose minimum time requirements regarding the state in which
The various statutory requirements can and do operate to prevent
compensation of asbestos victims and their survivors.4° But a nonstatu-
tory barrier may be even more significant. A recent study of 17,800
insulation workers found that a workers' compensation death claim
was made in only thirty-eight percent of the fatality cases. Of the sur-
viving spouses who did not file death claims, eighty percent gave igno-
rance as the reason.41
Many asbestos workers who do file compensation claims are un-
successful. According to one study, only thirty-eight percent of insula-
tion workers with mesothelioma who applied for compensation were
able to obtain any benefits at all.42 Often a worker will be unable to
prove permanent and total disability resulting from his asbestos-related
disease.43 Such workers are confronted with various limitations on
available benefits. Eleven states either omit or qualify benefits for par-
tial disability caused by asbestos exposure. 44 Seven other states limit
partial disability benefits for occupational diseases generally. 45 And
even those states that provide benefits for partial disability often do not
permit claimants to reapply for benefits when their conditions worsen,
the exposure occurred. These requirements may operate to bar recovery where the worker
has been exposed to asbestos while employed in different states during the course of his
working life. P. BARTH & H. HuNT, supra note 33, at 123. This may create "at least three
different time requirements for filing claims; the worker has been exposed to the hazard for
at least five years out of the past ten years, and at least two of these five years must have
occurred in the state in which the claim is filed." Id.
40. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 170 (statement of Sen. Gary Hart); Note, supra
note 25, at 921-25.
41. Occupational Disease Compensation and Social Security. Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm on Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
64, 68 (1981) (statement of Prof. Peter S. Barth). This same study found that five of every six
insulation workers were forced to leave work because of asbestos-related diseases. Id. at 65.
Only 29% of these workers ever filed a workers' compensation claim. Id. at 67.
Additional evidence of underutilization of compensation systems by asbestos victims is
provided by a study which found that, in 1981, only .3% of all workers' compensation claims
filed in California involved exposure to asbestos. 1982 Hearings, supra note 27, at 487 (state-
ment of Robin Obetz).
42. 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 227 (statement of Laurence J. Cohen, General
Counsel, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers). Part of the explana-
tion for this statistic may be that by the time a workers' claim is processed, he has already
died. Such an explanation is suggested by the fact that the median survival time from diag-
nosis for patients with mesothelioma is 4-12 months. R. George, R. Light & R. Matthay,
supra note 6, at 530. Thus, a more meaningful figure may be the number of widows who
obtain death benefits. According to one study, 23% of widows of workers who died from
asbestos-related disease did not receive any benefits at all after filing. 1982 Hearings, supra
note 27, at 475 (statement of Prof. William G. Johnson).
43. See, e.g., Chivoletto v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 330 So. 2d 295 (La. 1976); Pow-
ell v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 410 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 1982).
44. 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 227 (statement of Laurence J. Cohen).
45. Id.
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as they usually do in cases of asbestosis. 46
Workers who are able to prove total disability do not fare much
better. One study found that a worker who becomes totally disabled
for life from an occupational disease and who is able to prove that the
disability is linked to the workplace receives, on average, about $9,700
in total compensation benefits, compared to expected future earnings of
$77,000.4 7 Thus, on the average, workers' compensation benefits re-
place about one-eighth of lost wages. The ratio may be even lower
with respect to asbestos-related diseases, at least under laws which
award benefits based on rates prevailing at the time of exposure.
48
Despite the inadequacies of workers' compensation systems, vic-
tims of asbestos-related disease invariably find that no other relief is
available from their employers. Workers' compensation is, by statute,
the exclusive remedy for an injured worker against his employer if the
injury or occupational disease is covered by the statute, and if the em-
ployer has secured compensation insurance.49 Exclusive remedy
clauses have functioned in a number of jurisdictions to bar tort suits by
employees injured by exposure to asbestos.50
Two main approaches have been used by injured asbestos workers
attempting to escape the force of these clauses. In the first approach, an
injured worker argues that his employer deliberately injured him. The
worker's theory is that injuries resulting from such acts are not acciden-
tal, and thus are not encompassed by compensation statutes, but rather,
are compensable in tort.5 l Not all states, however, recognize the inten-
46. Id.
47. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 28, at 3-4.
48. Several courts have declined to award retroactive benefit increases in asbestos
cases. See Hawkins v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 418 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 1982); Bush v.
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 154 N.J. Super. 188, 381 A.2d 65 (App. Div. 1977); Dunn v.
Todd Shipyards Corp., B.R.B. No. 78-510 (filed June 12, 1981). But see White v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 416 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 1982); Shiffett v. Powhattan Mining Co., 293
Md. 198, 442 A.2d 980 (1982); Osteen v. A. C. & S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514
(1981); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 563 S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. 1978).
Workers' compensation is not the only possible source of wage replacement. However,
even when other sources such as social security and private pensions are considered, survi-
vors of workers who die from an asbestos-related disease still only recover, on average, 40%
of their losses. 1982 Hearings, supra note 27, at 474 (statement of Prof. William G.
Johnson).
49. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 65.10 (1982). An employer's protection under an
exclusivity clause is not contingent upon his liability under a claim for compensation bene-
fits. Farrall v. Armstrong Cork Co., 457 A.2d 763 (Del. Super. 1983); Christman v. Dravo
Corp., No. 79-29762 (Pa. Super., filed Feb. 11, 1983).
50. See, e.g., Weldon v. Celotex Corp., 695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1982); Bunker v. National
Gypsum Co., 406 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. App. 1980); Davis v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 338 A.2d
146 (Me. 1975).
51. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 68.11 (1982).
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tional tort exception.52 Those states that do recognize the exception
have strictly construed the requirement of intent, to the extent that this
approach usually has failed in asbestos cases.5 3
The second approach has been to argue the "dual capacity" doc-
trine. Under this doctrine, an employer may become vulnerable to tort
suit by an employee if he possesses a second persona completely in-
dependent from his status as employer.5 4 An asbestos worker urging
application of the dual capacity doctrine argues that the second per-
sona possessed by his employer is that of manufacturer of the asbestos
products that caused his injury.55
The basic rationale for permitting suit in the dual capacity situa-
tion is that an employer should not be able to escape tort liability on
the basis of the mere fortuitous circumstance that the injured individ-
ual was an employee of the manufacturer whose product caused the
injury.5 6 Although this argument is appealing, it should fail because
the requirement that the employer have an independent second capac-
ity is not met. The duty of a manufacturer to provide safe products to
the public cannot be separated from the manufacturer's duty to provide
safe products to its employees for use in their work.57 Asbestos workers
asserting the dual capacity doctrine usually have been unsuccessful.53
52. See, e.g., Kofron v. AmocoChem. Corp., 441 A.2d 226 (Del. 1982) (intentional tort
exception not recognized in asbestosis case).
53. See Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Copeland
v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 492 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1980); Petruska v. Johns-Manville,
83 F.R.D. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1979). But see Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (post-employment failure to warn of asbestos health hazards constitutes in-
tentional tort); In re Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. IM. 1981);
McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. IM. 1978); cf. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1980) (asbestos worker may sue his employer for aggravation of his injuries caused by the
alleged fraudulent concealment of the disease and its cause). The California decision is
discussed in Comment, Johns-Manille Products Corp. v. Superior Court.- The Not-So-Exclu-
sipe Remedy, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 263 (1981).
54. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 72.81 (1982). Professor Larson has narrowed his
definition in an attempt to correct what he calls the "looseness and overextension" attending
the doctrine. See id. An earlier edition of Larson's work would have permitted suit if the
employer merely occupied a second capacity that conferred on him obligations independent
of those imposed upon him as an employer. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 72.80
(1976).
55. See, e.g., Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
56. See Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
See generally Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suabilily: The Dual-Ca-
pacitfy Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974); Note, Dual Capacity Doctrine: Third-Pary
Liability of Employer-Manufacturer in Products Liability Litigation, 12 IND. L. REv. 553
(1979).
57. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 72.83 (1982).
58. See Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'g
505 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1981);In re Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229
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The net result of an asbestos worker's failure to argue successfully
the intentional tort exception or the dual capacity doctrine is that the
exclusive remedy against his or her employer is the inadequate work-
ers' compensation system. One commentator has concluded that
"[w]orker's [c]ompensation for asbestos-related diseases is, in all states,
at best inadequate, at worst a travesty.
59
Workers' compensation, in addition to being inadequate for the
employee, is inequitable for the employer. The most common practice
in cases of occupational disease is to assign liability to the carrier who
provided coverage when the disease resulted in disability, if the em-
ployment at the time of disability involved conditions that could have
caused the disease.60 This practice is unfair to the last employer when
conditions in one or more previous employments also contributed to
the development of the disease.6' This practice is also unfair when an
insurer providing coverage for only a brief period of time at the end of
a claimant's work history is held liable for the claimant's disease, since
the disease probably could not have been caused by such very recent
(N.D. Ill. 1981); cf. Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981)
(dual capacity doctrine rejected where manufacturer sought contribution from employer);
Farrall v. Armstrong Cork Co., 457 A.2d 763 (Del. Super. 1983) (also rejecting dual capacity
doctrine in contribution context).
59. Asch, Asbestos Law.- Victims' Rights and Industry's Reaction, 330 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. Sci. 255, 255 (1979).
60. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 95.21 (1982).
61. Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 415 So. 2d 174, 176 (La. 1981). Additional
arguments against the last-injurious-exposure rule may be made. An employer (or insurer)
may be more likely to dispute a potentially large claim when the entire burden falls on him.
P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 33, at 129. Such an approach also might discourage
employers from hiring not yet disabled individuals who previously worked under conditions
favorable to the development of occupational disease. Robin v. Royal Improvement Co.,
289 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1979).
The policy rationale for using a last-injurious-exposure rule to determine liability in
cases of asbestos-related disease is that absent the rule, and absent apportionment of liabil-
ity, a disabled worker would be placed in the very difficult position of having to prove which
source of asbestos exposure caused his disease. That is, the rule has the virtue of being
definite. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 95.21 (1982). Liability is not apportioned in asbestos
cases because of the difficulty of accurately determining the date of onset of an asbestos-
related disease and the degree of aggravation by subsequent exposure. See General Dynam-
ics Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 565 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1977); Osteen v. A. C. & S., Inc., 209
Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981).
This type of apportionment is unnecessary. All that is required is the use of pro-rata
apportionment, the proportion to be determined by the ratio of the number of years the
insurer was on the risk to the total number of years of exposure. This approach is certainly
more equitable than assigning all liability to the last employer. However, use of an appor-
tionment formula would increase fractional costs of workers' compensation systems, due to
the necessity of identifying the various sources of asbestos exposure and assuring that each
employer is assessed and then pays its proportionate share. See P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra
note 33, at 129.
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exposure. While some courts have recognized this,62 others have not.63
Tort Compensation
While workers' compensation laws make compensation the exclu-
sive remedy for an injured worker against his employer, the employee
is not barred from bringing suit against a third-party manufacturer of
the asbestos products he worked with. Even in tort actions, however,
the victim of an asbestos-related disease may face insurmountable ob-
stacles to recovery. An initial obstacle is the applicable statute of
limitations.
Statutes of Limitations
Traditionally, most statutes of limitations have provided that a suit
must be brought within a specified period of time after the cause of
action accrues. 64 Since all of the asbestos-related diseases have very
long average latency periods,65 the time of accrual of the cause of ac-
tion for these diseases is subject to dispute. The cause of action might
be held to accrue when the plaintiff is exposed to asbestos, when the
plaintiff's disease is first medically diagnosable, or when the plaintiff's
disease has manifested itself by symptoms, such as shortness of breath,
that should or in fact do alert the plaintiff to the presence of a disease. 66
A majority of courts considering the issue have applied a "discov-
ery rule" by holding that the statute does not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his or her disease,
whether his or her action sounds in negligence or strict liability.67 Sev-
62. See Scott Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 98, 188 Cal. Rptr.
537 (1983); Crepeau v. Krost Insulation Co., No. CX-82-1239 (Minn., filed April 15, 1983);
Busse v. Quality Insulation Co., 322 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1982); Northwestern Asbestos &
Cork Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 554, 124 N.W.2d 682 (1963). See also Mid-South
Insulation Co. v. Buckley, 396 So. 2d 7 (Miss. 1981).
63. See Fossum v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 293 Or. 252, 646 P.2d 1337 (1982); Osteen
v. A. C. & S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981); Caudle-Hyatt, Inc. v. Mixon, 220
Va. 495, 260 S.E.2d 193 (1979). Cf. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Luker, 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (last-injurious-exposure aggravated pre-existing asbestosis).
64. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 1177, 1200
(1950).
65. In one study of insulation workers, lung cancer rates peaked at 30-35 years from the
onset of employment, and asbestosis at 40-45 years. Pleural mesothelioma peaked at 35-39
years, and peritoneal mesothelioma at 45 years. Selikoff, Hammond & Seidman, Latency of
Asbestos Disease Among Insulation Workers in the United States and Canada, 46 CANCER
2736 (1980).
66. Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 686 F.2d 570, 572-74 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1233 (1983).
67. See, e.g., Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. W. Va. 1981);
Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1979);
Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979); Nolan v.
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eral jurisdictions have mandated the same result by statute. 68
Courts applying the discovery rule in asbestos cases have used a
bewildering variety of formulations. Some of these formulations can
have inequitable consequences. Under one approach, the limitations
period begins to run when the plaintiff should have discovered his as-
bestosis, 69 presumably even if he has not discovered the cause of the
disease. Other courts have held that the cause of action accrues when
the asbestos-related disease manifests itself by symptoms that could
have enabled the plaintiff to discover the injury, even though the symp-
toms were not such that a reasonable person would have discovered the
injury.70
Of greater concern to asbestos victims are statutes of limitations
that do not apply the discovery rule. Under one such approach, the
cause of action accrues on the date of the plaintiff's last exposure to
asbestos. 71 This rule is quite harsh; a worker may not have any reason
to bring suit until decades after his last exposure to asbestos because
asbestos-related diseases have such long latency periods.
Other rules commence the running of the statute when the plain-
tiff's disease is first medically diagnosable, 72 or when damage to the
plaintiff occurs.73 These rules may bar many claims that could be
brought under discovery rules, since damage caused by an asbestos-
Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981); Harig v. Johns-Manville
Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978). But cf. Note, Preserving Causes ofAction in
Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. Date-of-the Injury Accrual Rule, 68
VA. L. REV. 615, 625 n.77 (1982) (it is difficult to know whether or not the discovery rule is
the majority rule, given its various articulations).
68. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-30(b) (Supp. 1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.2
(West 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(5)
(Supp. 1981).
69. Fusco v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 643 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying
Texas law).
70. See Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1154, 1158 (6th Cir.
1981) (applying Ohio law prior to Ohio's statutory adoption of the discovery rule); Kajala
v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota law).
71. Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010-11, 430 N.E.2d 1297,
1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982). Several attempts to
enact a discovery rule in New York have been unsuccessful, with the exception of a 1981
enactment by the legislature of a discovery rule for Vietnam veterans who sustained injuries
as a result of exposure to Agent Orange. ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 4,922 (May 14, 1982). But
cf. Jacobowitz v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 79 C 865 (E.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 28, 1982) (ap-
plying the admiralty doctrine of laches, rather than New York's statute of limitations, to the
claims of shipyard workers against asbestos manufacturers).
72. Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 686 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1233 (1983) (applying Wisconsin law).
73. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981). See also Note,
Preserving Causes ofAction, supra note 67, at 632 (the Locke rule probably bars many ac-
tions that could be maintained under a discovery rule). But cf. White v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (directing the applica-
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related disease frequently precedes the symptoms. For example, many
workers with localized mesotheliomas are asymptomatic even when
their tumors are quite large.74 Indeed, on many occasions the presence
of a tumor has been revealed only at autopsy.75 Similarly, an asbestos
worker with significant pulmonary damage from asbestosis may have
no symptoms and no X-ray abnormality.76 In these cases the statute
would be running even though the workers had no reason to suspect
that they had causes of action.
Two additional statute of limitations questions are of concern to
victims of asbestos-related disease in jurisdictions that do apply discov-
ery rules. The first is whether or not discovery of one disease should
commence the running of the statute on another disease. This issue is
of concern because many victims develop multiple diseases 77 that have
different latency periods. It may be argued that because a single
wrongful act (a failure to warn of the hazards of asbestos exposure)
caused all of the diseases, the statute should run on all of them with the
discovery of any one.78 This reasoning is unpersuasive because in a
latent disease case the existence of the disease is as much an issue as its
cause.79 A more logical approach is to commence the running of the
statute independently for each disease, on the basis that the diseases
themselves are independent.80
The second question is whether or not a discovery rule should be
applied to survival and/or wrongful death actions81 involving exposure
to asbestos. The prevailing view is that a discovery rule is inapplicable
tion of the admiralty doctrine of laches, rather than Virginia's statute of limitations, to the
claims of shipyard workers against asbestos manufacturers).
74. G. GUENTER & M. WELCH, PULMONARY MEDICINE 481 (1977).
75. M. DUNNILL, PULMONARY PATHOLOGY 425 (1982).
76. J. CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, supra note 7, at 594. See also G. SNIDER, CLINICAL
PULMONARY MEDICINE 290 (1981) (asbestosis is clinically asymptomatic in the early stages).
77. Over 50% of patients with asbestosis die of lung cancer. W. MORGAN & A. SEA-
TON, supra note 7, at 360-61.
78. See Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp., -Pa. Super. -, 450 A.2d 681,688-89 (1982);
Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 124/209/10330 (Bait. Cty. Cir. Ct., Md., filed
Sept. 23, 1981).
79. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
80. See id. at 120; Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671, 674
(D.D.C. 1981). Cf. Daniels v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn. App. 1978)
(in asbestosis suit, testimony regarding association between asbestos and cancer excluded on
grounds of irrelevancy and prejudice).
While this approach may be more logical, there is some doubt as to whether it is always
medically correct. In particular, the medical community is divided as to whether or not lung
cancer caused by exposure to asbestos may develop absent antecedent asbestosis. The better
view is that it may not. See W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 294-95. But see J. CROFTON & A.
DOUGLAS, supra note 7, at 591.
81. Wrongful death actions serve to compensate a decedent's relatives for their own
losses, while survival actions permit a decedent's representative to recover for the decedent's
own injuries. 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 14.1, at 408 (2d ed. 1975).
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to both survival82 and wrongful death 83 actions. The argument against
applying a discovery rule in survival actions is that the latest a decedent
can discover his cause of action is just prior to his death, and if he does
not discover it by then there is no cause of action to be kept alive by the
decedent's representatives. 84 It is irrelevant when the representatives
make their discovery as to decedent's disease, since it is not their cause
of action.
In a wrongful death case, the purported rationale for not applying
a discovery rule is that it is the fact of death itself which should put
plaintiffs on inquiry regarding a cause of action. 85 This rationale as-
sumes that all of the information from which the cause of the dece-
dent's death may be ascertained is available to plaintiffs at the time of
death.86 Such an assumption is not always correct. 87 One situation in
which the assumption is not correct is where defendants have concealed
the facts necessary to determine whether or not a cause of action exists.
When plaintiffs are able to prove tortious fraudulent concealment of
facts, some courts will make an exception and apply a discovery rule. 88
82. See, e.g., Johnson v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1981); McDaniel
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Mitchell v. United Asbes-
tos Corp., 100 Ill. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d 350 (1981).
83. See O'Connell v. Keene Corp., No. 81 C 7306 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 7, 1982); Mc-
Daniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 542 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Decosse v. Arm-
strong Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1982). But see In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis
Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ill. 1981); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.2(c) (West 1982).
84. McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1241, 1243 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
One court has advanced the alternative argument that applying the discovery rule beyond
the date of death would be contrary to the purpose of the statute of limitations to prevent
stale claims: "Allowing the discovery rule to run past the date of death would allow survival
actiols to be brought at any time the decedent's estate through medical advancement or
otherwise discovered the cause of the decedent's injuries that were suffered during his life-
time." Johnson v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (emphasis in
original).
85. Krueger v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 305 N.W.2d 18, 23 (N.D. 1981).
86. Woody v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1073, 1074 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
87. For example, in airplane crash cases, it is possible that either the cause or the fact of
the crash will not be discovered until sometime after the crash has occurred. Courts have
applied discovery rules in these cases. See Wetzel v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 491 F.
Supp. 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc.. 42 Il. App. 3d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686
(1976); see also Shaughnessy v. Spray, 55 Or. App. 42, 637 P.2d 182 (1981) (discovery rule
applied in wrongful death action involving manufacture and prescription of propoxyphene,
a medication).
88. See, e.g., Krueger v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 305 N.W.2d 18, 24 (N.D. 1981). In
DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn. 1982), the court remanded a
wrongful death action on the basis that manufacturers may have fraudulently concealed the
hazards of asbestos exposure from decedents. This approach is questionable, because the
statute of limitations should be tolled in a wrongful death action only if fraudulent conceal-
ment has prevented those who have the right to bring the action from discovering that the
action exists. That is, for statute of limitations purposes, non-disclosure to decedents should
be relevant in a survival action, but not in a wrongful death action.
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A similar exception will not be made for mere negligent concealment. 89
State of the Art Defense
Asbestos plaintiffs able to surmount the statute of limitations bar-
rier have a choice of theories to argue at trial. Two theories of liability
that asbestos plaintiffs commonly assert are negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability.90 A plaintiff asserting a negligence theory must establish
a duty, a breach, causation, and damages. 91
Plaintiffs in asbestos suits commonly argue that the manufacturer's
failure to warn of the hazards of asbestos exposure establishes the
breach element. In a negligence action, a seller is "under a duty to give
adequate warning of unreasonable dangers involved in the use [of his
product] of which he knows or should know."'92 Thus, state of the art
evidence 93 is and should be relevant in negligence-based actions, inas-
much as it determines the scope of the duty owed. When plaintiffs are
able to establish the availability of knowledge of asbestos hazards,
courts will find that the manufacturers had the duty to warn of those
hazards. 94 The breach of this duty may result in the imposition of
liability.
A plaintiff asserting a strict products liability theory95 must prove
a defect in the product which injured him, a causal link between this
defect and his injury, and the manufacturer's knowledge that the prod-
89. See Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp., 520 F. Supp. 865, 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981). But cf.
Johnson v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (under Ohio law, statute
of limitations is tolled neither by negligent nor by fraudulent concealment of plaintifi's cause
of action).
90. A third possible theory of liability is breach of implied warranty. Asbestos plain-
tiffs asserting this theory have been notably unsuccessful, primarily because privity does not
exist between asbestos suppliers and the'employees of asbestos purchasers. See, e.g., Star-
ling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183, 191-92 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (applying
Georgia law); In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-41 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (applying Illinois law).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
92. W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 646-47 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted).
93. State of the art evidence pertains to the state of scientific and technological knowl-
edge with respect to a given product at the time of the product's manufacture and design.
Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability
Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 1, 5 (1982). But c/. Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. Rnv. 343, 344, 439 (1982) (at least six
discrete uses of the term "state of the art" appear in court opinions and critical literature; use
of the term should be abandoned because it engenders needless confusion).
94. See Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 542 n.2 (D. Minn.
1982); Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894, 904 (E.D. Va. 1979), af 'd in part,
vacated in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981).
95. Asbestos, though a mineral, is a "product" for purposes of strict products liability.
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Hammond v.
North American Asbestos Corp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 435 N.E.2d 540 (1982).
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uct would reach users without substantial change of the condition in
which it was sold.96 One of the three classes of defects in products
liability law is a failure to warn or properly instruct.97
The standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts re-
quires the seller to warn of a danger of which it has knowledge or "by
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge .. .. "98 This standard expressly opens the
door to state of the art evidence in strict products liability actions.
The appropriateness of applying the Restatement's standard in as-
bestos cases is subject to dispute. The issue usually arises when manu-
facturers attempt to defend on the basis that the state of the medical art
up to the mid-1960's was such that the danger to insulation workers
was not reasonably known. Manufacturers argue that since the danger
was not reasonably known, no duty to warn was created and therefore
insulation products were not unreasonably dangerous or defective for
failure to warn.99
The recent trend of court decisions is to strike the state of the art
defense in asbestos suits where plaintiffs assert a strict liability theory
based on failure to warn.1' The fundamental reason for striking the
defense in this situation is that to allow it is to equate the failure to
warn standard applied under strict liability with that applied under a
negligence theory, thus completely removing the distinctions between
the two causes of action. 01
It also may be argued that to allow the defense is to frustrate the
basic goals that underlie strict products liability law. The first of these
goals is risk spreading, which provides compensation to accident vic-
tims by shifting losses to product manufacturers who pass their costs on
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
97. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A [4][f][i] (1981).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS) § 402A comment j (1965).
99. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982).
100. See, e.g., Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 80-128 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1982);
Cardamone v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., No. 78-1117 (E.D. Pa., filed July 20, 1981); Flatt v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 841-42 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Noecker v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
No. 366(118) (Phil. Ct. C.P., Pa., April Term 1977, filed April 28, 1982); Tuttle v. Johns-
Manville Corp., No. 76-15031 (Boulder Cty. Dist. Ct., Colo., filed Nov. 1, 1979). Bui see
Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 545 (D. Minn. 1982); Migues v.
Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1188 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1981); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod-
ucts Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975); Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D.
329, 333 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
101. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 208-09, 447 A.2d 539, 548-
49 (1982); Noecker v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 366(118) (Phil. Ct. C.P., Pa., filed Apr. 28,
1982).
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to the public in the form of price increases.102 Allowing the state of the
art defense frustrates this goal because the manufacturers and distribu-
tors of asbestos products are better able than injured plaintiffs to allo-
cate the costs of injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos. 0 3
A second goal of strict liability is accident avoidance, or the crea-
tion of a financial incentive for manufacturers to improve the safety of
their products.'0 4 Since the state of the art at a given time is partly a
function of industry's investment in safety research, imposition of lia-
bility for the failure to discover hazards creates an incentive for addi-
tional investment.10 5
The counter-arguments seem persuasive. First, the manufacturers
of asbestos products are not necessarily superior cost-allocators; most
of them have been out of the asbestos insulation business for at least a
decade. 10 6 These manufacturers are unable to pass their costs on to the
public in the form of price increases because the offending products are
no longer being manufactured. 10 7 Second, many powerful incentives
exist already for a manufacturer to make its products as safe as it possi-
102. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liabilityfor Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx.
L. REv. 81, 82 (1973).
103. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,206, 447 A.2d 539, 547 (1982).
104. See Spradley, supra note 93, at 396, 409.
105. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207, 447 A.2d 539, 548 (1982).
106. UNARCO ceased to manufacture products containing asbestos in 1970, the Keene
Corporation ceased in 1972, and Eagle-Picher ceased in 1971 or 1972. 1982 Hearings, supra
note 27, at 95, 239; Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 23 (1st
Cir. 1982).
107. It might be argued that asbestos manufactureres still are superior cost allocators
because their insurers cover the costs of injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos. This
argument also is unpersuasive. First, the assumption that all asbestos manufacturers carried
adequate insurance is false. For example, prior to 1968 Eagle-Picher was completely unin-
sured for liability resulting from exposure to its asoestos products. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (Ist Cir. 1982). If a manufacturer's insurance
coverage is judicially interpreted to be triggered by the manifestation of a disease, as it was
in Eagle-Picher, then a prior lack of coverage would not necessarily defeat loss-spreading,
since asbestos-related diseases have such long latency periods. But where a court interprets
an insurance policy to mean that coverage is triggered by exposure, e.g., Insurance Co. of
North Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), modifledon reh'g,
657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1075 (1981), loss-spreading by insurers is
denied where a manufacturer was uninsured at the time of exposure. Moreover, loss-spread-
ing is denied even under Eagle-Picher for diseases manifesting themselves after insurance
companies stopped providing insurance coverage to asbestos manufacturers. Finally, if a
plaintiff is unable to identify a particular manufacturer's product as the cause of his injury,
and market share liability is not imposed, see infra notes 116-43 & accompanying text, then
that manufacturer's insurers would be free of liability. For more detailed discussions of the
insurance coverage problem in asbestos litigation, see, e.g., Comment, Insurer Liability in the
Asbestos Disease Context-Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 27 S.D.L.
REv. 239 (1982); Note, Asbestos Litigation: The Insurance Coverage Question, 15 IND. L.
Rv. 831 (1982).
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bly can.108 Third, strict liability cannot be an incentive to increased
research and development if the manufacturer knows liability will be
imposed whether or not it improves the technology of its product. 1' 9
This argument is a variant of the more fundamental contention that to
exclude state of the art evidence is to convert the doctrine of strict lia-
bility into one of absolute liability. Such a conversion in effect makes
manufacturers the insurers of their products.
If the state of the art defense is to be allowed in asbestos litigation
based on strict products liability, it is likely that many asbestos victims
will go uncompensated. Asbestos manufacturers did not begin to warn
of the dangers associated with asbestos exposure until the 1960's."10
But to a considerable degree the provision of warnings coincided with
the state of the medical art. Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, the nation's leading
authority on asbestos-related disease, has summarized the general state
of medical knowledge pertaining to asbestos as it existed in the early
1960's:
With a few important exceptions, the evidence at that time rested on
scattered reports of small numbers of cases, and the cases themselves
were sometimes selected or simply those that happened to come to
the attention of the writer. The population base from which these
cases came was seldom mentioned or could not be ascertained....
The possibility that quite low dosages might have grave conse-
quences 30 years after initial exposure was still tenuous." I
The few important exceptions to the early dearth of knowledge
concerning the effects of asbestos exposure are studies that involved
asbestos miners and millers. The relationship between asbestosis and
lung cancer was not confirmed until 1955,112 and the relationship be-
tween asbestos and mesothelioma was not indicated until 1960,113 but
108. Robb, supra note 93, at 31-32 & n.135 (these incentives include the rule of negli-
gence liability and the desire to avoid a reputation for manufacturing dangerous products).
109. Id. at 31.
110. The first warnings were given in 1964 by Johns-Manville, Eagle-Picher and Owens-
Coming; 1966 by Fibreboard and Ruberoid; 1968 by Pittsburgh Coming; 1969 by Keene;
1971 by Celotex (previously Philip Carey); and 1972 by Amatex, H.K. Porter and Raybes-
tos-Manhattan. G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL,
LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS at E16 (1980). A number of these manufacturers began
issuing warnings only under pressure from OSHA. Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 525 F.
Supp. 894, 904 (E.D. Va. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981).
11. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 15, at 31 (citation omitted). One indication of the
early lack of medical knowledge is that asbestos was sometimes injected surgically into the
pleural cavity in the 1940's to promote the formation of adhesions. See id. at 262.
112. See Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers, 12 BRIT. J. INDUS.
MED. 81 (1955).
113. See Wagner, Sleggs & Marchand, Diffuse Pleural Mesothelioma and Asbestos Expo-
sure in the North Western Cape Province, 17 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 260 (1960); M. DUNNILL,
supra note 75, at 422 (prior to 1960 there were serious doubts as to whether primary pleural
mesothelioma existed at all as an entity).
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even these studies did not involve insulation workers. The hazard for
workers and other persons who use or are exposed to finished asbestos
products has only recently been appreciated."14 It was not until 1964-
65 that the hazard to insulation workers came to light.115
In summary, state of the art evidence is relevant in negligence-
based actions to determine the scope of the duty owed, and it ought to
be admissible in strict products liability cases based on the manufac-
turer's failure to warn of the hazard, since to exclude it in such cases is
to convert the doctrine of strict products liability into one of absolute
liability. But when state of the art evidence is admissible, it may pre-
clude recovery for victims of asbestos-related disease, since asbestos
manufacturers began warning of the dangers to insulation workers
within a few years after these dangers were known.
Proof of Causation
It is frequently the case in an asbestos suit that a plaintiff has been
exposed to asbestos produced by more than one manufacturer. Where
the plaintiff is able to prove the identities of all of the parties who pro-
duced the asbestos to which he was exposed, the manufacturers can be
held jointly and severally liable.16 This approach is desirable because
114. R. George, R. Light & R. Matthay, supra note 6, at 380; H. HINSHAW & J. MUR-
RAY, supra note 11, at 722-24.
115. Sse Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation
Workers in the United States, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 139 (1965).
A series of letters written during the 1930's and 1940's between Sumner Simpson, for-
mer president of Raybestos-Manhattan, and Vandiver Brown, former general counsel at
Johns-Manville, suggests that these manufacturers were aware of the asbestos hazard in
mines and mills, and made the conscious decision to ignore the available evidence. In one
such exchange Simpson wrote: "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are.
•... " Brown responded: "I quite agree with you that our interests are best served by
having asbestosis receive the minimum amount of publicity." The letters are reprinted in
1979 Hearings, supra note 12, at 152. Industry representatives have downplayed the signifi-
cance of the letters on the basis that even if the letters indicate an awareness of the hazards
in mines and mills, this knowledge "cannot be extrapolated to present cases involving expo-
sure to insulation products." Asbestos-Related Occupational Diseases: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Compensation, Health and Safety of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 642 (1978) (statement of Francis H. May, Executive Vice-President,
Johns-Manville Corp.) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
However, there is some evidence to indicate that knowledge about the hazards to insu-
lation workers was available prior to Dr. Selikofi's pioneering study in the 1960's. The evi-
dence in part is in the form of depositions taken of the Manville Corporation's former top
medical officer, the late Dr. Kenneth W. Smith. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Johns-
Manville Asbestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D. 853 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Noecker v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
No. 366(118) (Phil. Ct. C.P., Pa., fied Apr. 28, 1982).
116. See, eg., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1096 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. dei."ed, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Burke v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. C-1-81-289
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in a multiple exposure situation it is probably impossible to prove that
a particular product caused the resultant disease.'
1 7
An alternative scenario is that a plaintiff is unable to identify any
of the manufacturers who produced the asbestos to which he was ex-
posed. In this situation, a plaintiff would be unable to recover under
traditional products liability law because he has failed to establish cau-
sation."1 8 Asbestos plaintiffs confronted with the causation barrier in
this context have at times asserted theories of market share liability. 119
The theory of market share liability was first judicially pro-
pounded in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.2 0 The California Supreme
Court held in Sindell that if a plaintiff proves that she contracted a
DES-related cancer and that her mother took DES during pregnancy,
then market share apportionment determines a manufacturer's liability
unless the manufacturer exculpates itself by proving that its product
could not have caused the injury.' 2 1
The Sindell decision has been the subject of a great deal of aca-
demic commentary, and many of the approving commentaries have
suggested the application of market share liability to asbestos litiga-
tion. 12 2 However, such an application would involve somewhat differ-
ent considerations from those involved in the DES suits.
First, DES was often prescribed by generic rather than brand
name, while the converse was true for the marketing of asbestos. 12 3 The
assumption underlying the relevancy of this distinction is that plaintiffs
(S.D. Ohio, filed Oct. 27, 1981); Migues v. Nicolet Indus., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D.
Tex. 1980), rev'd in part sub nom. Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. Migues v. Nicolet Indus., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd in part sub
nom. Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981).
118. W. PROSSER, sua note 92, § 103.
119. See, e.g., Herbeck v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. SA-80-CA-520 (W.D. Tex.,
filed Feb. 23, 1982).
120. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
Sindell involved DES (diethystilbestrol), a synthetic estrogen-type drug taken by several
million pregnant women between 1947 and 1971 to prevent miscarriages. DES has been
linked to cancerous vaginal tract abnormalities in prenatally exposed daughters of DES
users, and this has resulted in the filing of numerous suits against DES manufacturers.
Note, Market Share Liability.- An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV.
668, 668-69 (1981). The California Supreme Court's decision in Sindell was significantly
influenced by an earlier law review commentary. See Comment, DES and a Proposed The-
ory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
121. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
145.
122. See, e.g., Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recoveryfor D.E.S. Liti-
gants, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 551, 580 (1981); Note, Industry- Wide Liability and Market Share
Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REV. 423, 425 n.10 (1981); Note, Manufacturer's Liability
Based on a Market Share Theory. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 16 TULSA L.J. 286, 301
n.82 (1980).
123. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183, 190-91 (S.D. Ga.
1982).
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bringing suit three or four decades after they were exposed to asbestos
will be able to remember the names on the labels of the products to
which they were exposed, if they had the initial opportunity to view
those labels. 24 Where this assumption is correct, market share liability
cannot be imposed. The Sindell court held that imposition of market
share liability was justified only where the plaintiff was unable to iden-
tify any manufacturer of the products causing his injury. 25 Several
courts have rejected the market share theory in asbestos cases because
the plaintiff was able to identify at least one manufacturer who pro-
duced the asbestos to which he was exposed. 26
In other cases the plaintiff will be unable to recall the label name
or the product manufacturer will not be available as a defendant. The
availability problem is compounded by the fact that some of the asbes-
tos manufacturers, including the Manville Corporation, the nation's
largest, have filed petitions to reorganize under chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act. 127 Since these filings automatically stay the com-
mencement or continuation of judicial proceedings against the filing
debtor companies, 28 defendants who may be identifiable are no longer
available to be sued. Thus, asbestos plaintiffs may have additional
need to rely on market share theories.
124. See Garcia v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 81-649-CIV-T-GC (M.D. Fla., filed
Aug. 28, 1981).
125. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
144.
126. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Prelick v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Gorniak v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc.,
No. 78-465 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 6, 1981).
127. To date, three defendants have filed reorganization petitions under the Act, 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. V 1981). Seeln re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11,656 to B
11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 26, 1982); In re UNR Indus., Nos. 82-B-9841 to 82-B-
9851 (Bankr. N.D. IlL., filed July 29, 1982); In re Amatex Corp., No. 82-05, 220 K (Bankr.
E.D. Pa., filed Nov. 1, 1982).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. V 1981). In Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982), the Court held that the.Bankruptcy Reform Act's
broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges violated article III of the United States
Constitution. Arguably, the Northern Pipeline decision deprived the bankruptcy and district
courts of bankruptcy jurisdiction. However, the Court has refused without comment a peti-
tion by some of Manville's non-filing co-defendants for a writ of prohibition and/or manda-
mus that would prohibit federal or bankruptcy judges from exercising the automatic stay
provisions of the Act. ASBESTos LITIG. RPTR., 6,243 (Feb. 25, 1983).
Non-filing co-defendants also have been generally unsuccessful in having the emer-
gency stay provisions extended to cover them. See, e.g., Austin v. UNARCO Indus., Inc.,
No. 82-1168 (1st Cir., filed Mar. 30, 1983); Pitts v. UNARCO Indus., Inc., 698 F.2d 313 (7th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 660 P.2d 271 (Wash. 1983) (en banc);
Note, The Marnville Bankruptcy. Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1139 n.90 (1983) (as of December 1, 1982, at least 38 courts had held
that § 362(a) applies only to the filing debtor company; as of the same date, 14 courts had
stayed proceedings against all co-defendants, but many of these stays were only temporary).
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Another distinction between asbestos litigation and DES litigation
is that DES plaintiffs were exposed to DES before they were born,
whereas asbestos plaintiffs typically were exposed to asbestos over the
course of their working lives. This distinction is important because
DES plaintiffs can identify exactly when the physical tort occurred
(when they were in utero), thereby giving manufacturers some bench-
mark from which to disprove causation. 129 In contrast, the time frame
in asbestos cases from which the manufacturers must disprove causa-
tion (the entire length of a plaintiff's employment history) is very wide,
and the burden may be impossible to overcome.
A third distinction is that, unlike asbestos products, DES was pro-
duced from identical formulas and was fungible. 130  Thus, while DES
was uniformly harmful, asbestos products were not. The variable
pathogenicity of asbestos products is apparent on several levels. First,
not all types of asbestos are equally harmful; crocidolite is the most
pathogenic type, at least in the induction of mesothelioma.131 More-
over, the pathogenicity of crocidolite itself varies according to where
the mineral was mined. 132 Finally, not all products made of the same
type of asbestos are equally harmful, since they may contain different
percentages of asbestos and products with greater percentages are more
dangerous. 133
129. See Garcia v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 81-649-CIV-T-GC (M.D. Fla., filed
Aug. 28, 1981).
130. Note, The Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation: Is There an Alternative Theory
of Liability?, 15 IND. L. REv. 679, 691-93 (1982).
131. See W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 287 (crocidolite is almost exclusively causally
related to mesotheliomas in man); Newhouse, supra note 11, at 253 (weight of the evidence
suggests there is a gradient from crocidolite through amosite to chrysotile in their potential
potency to induce mesothelioma). Differences in pathogenicity are primarily linked to the
aerodynamics and shapes of the various fiber types. Crocidolite fibers are straight, whereas
chrysotile fibers resemble stretched coils; hence the retention of the former in the lung is six
times that of the latter because straighter fibers are less likely to be intercepted prior to
deposition in the lung. J. CROFTON & A. DOUGLAS, supra note 7, at 592.
The evidence on lung cancer is more conflicting. Compare Becklake, supra note 12, at
189 (risk for lung cancer production is greater for crocidolite than for chrysotile) with I.
SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 15, at 327 (all types of asbestos except crocidolite have been
incriminated in the production of lung cancer). One factor that makes it difficult to resolve
this particular dispute is that the majority of industrial exposure to asbestos has been to a
mixture of the asbestos types. See Pooley, supra note 6, at 247.
Because crocidolite apparently is the most dangerous type of asbestos, stringent regula-
tions virtually have banned its use in Britain since 1970. However, increasing quantities of
crocidolite are being used in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. W. MORGAN &
A. SEATON, supra note 7, at 374; W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 235.
132. Crocidolite from the North Western Cape Province of South Africa is much more
pathogenic than that from the Transvaal region of the same country. Kannerstein, Churg &
McCaughey, Asbestos and Mesothelioma." A Review, 13 PATHOL. ANN. 81, 95 (1978). See
also L. PREGER, supra note 11, at 86.
133. A dose-response relationship exists for all of the asbestos-related diseases and for
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Asbestos plaintiffs often have had exposure to a wide variety of
products that are not equally harmful. Similarly, manufacturers may
have produced different types of asbestos products and thus would
have a different market share for each product. As a result, in asbestos
suits it may be impossible to quantify market shares relative to harm
such that apportionment of damages would reflect fault. 134 This result
is made more likely by the fact that cigarettes are co-carcinogens with
asbestos, at least in the induction of lung cancer. 35
Defining the relevant market and determining market shares are
the thorniest practical problems associated with the application of mar-
ket share liability to asbestos litigation. Another important concern is
that applying the theory probably would distort the defendant manu-
facturer's actual liability. This distortion is a function of several
factors.
The first factor is that Sindell allows both plaintiffs and defendants
the option of identifying a particular defendant as the manufacturer
all asbestos fiber types. Becklake, Asbestos-Related Diseases of the Lung and Other Organs:
Their Eidemiology and Implicationsfor Clinical Practice, 114 AM. REV. REsP. Dis. 187, 216
(1976).
134. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co.,'533 F. Supp. 183, 191 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
In Dombroff v. Armstrong Cork Co., No. 79-14048 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct., Fla., filed Aug. 3,
1981), the court did devise a market share formula. However, Dombroff, the only opinion to
date to discuss in any detail the mechanics of applying market share liability to asbestos
litigation, has been overruled. See ASBESTOS LrrIG. RPTR. 4,978 (May 28, 1982).
135. Authorities agree that a smoker who has been exposed to asbestos is 50 to 90 times
more likely to incur lung cancer than a nonsmoker who has not been exposed. See, e.g.,
1979 Hearings, supra note 12, at 79 (statement of Dr. David P. Rall). One widely-cited study
concluded that a nonsmoker who has been heavily exposed to asbestos is five times more
likely to develop lung cancer than a nonsmoker who has not been exposed. See Hammond,
Selikoff & Seidman, Asbestos Exposure, Cigarette Smoking and Death Rates, 330 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 473 (1979). However, this study has been criticized, e.g., R. MONSON,
OCCUPATIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 194-96 (1980); Saracci, Asbestos and Lung Cancer: An Anal-
ysis of the Epidemiological Evidence on the Asbestos-Smoking Interaction, 20 INT'L J. CAN-
cnn 323, 327 (1977), and its finding of increased lung cancer in nonsmoking asbestos
workers has not been replicated in most studies. See Craighead, Abraham & Pratt, The
Pathology of Asbestos-Associated Diseases of the Lungs and Pleural Cavities: Diagnostic Cri-
teria and Proposed Grading Schema, 106 ARCHIVES PATHOL. & LABORATORY MED. 544, 588
(1982); see also L. PREGER, supra note 11, at 186 (there is no proof that asbestos exposure in
the absence of a smoking history is carcinogenic to the lungs).
The best evidence suggests that exposure to asbestos alone does not increase the risk of
developing lung cancer, but asbestos and smoking together act synergistically. R. George,
R. Light & R. Matthay, supra note 6, at 394; G. SNIDER, supra note 76, at 293. In contrast,
cigarette smoking plays no part in the initiation of mesothelioma, and it has only an additive
effect, rather than a synergistic one, with respect to asbestosis. L. PREGER, supra note 11, at
29, 124; I. SELIKOFF & D. LE, supra note 15, at 279; Samet, Epler, Gaensler & Rosner,
Absence of Synergism Between Exposure to Asbestos and Cigarette Smoking in Asbestosis, 120
AM. REV. REsp. Dis. 75, 80 (1979).
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that produced the harmful substance. 36 Some manufacturers thus
would pay full damages in specific identification cases and proportion-
ate damages in market share cases; hence the burden of paying dam-
ages would be disproportionately distributed. 37
A second factor contributing to distorted liability is that the
Sindell decision contemplates that the joined defendants will be re-
sponsible for one hundred percent of the judgment. 38 Thus, liability is
apportioned according to relative market shares even if the joined de-
fendants represent less than one hundred percent of the market. The
degree to which this factor acts to distort liability is directly propor-
tional to the percentage of the market that is required to be joined
before market share liability will be imposed. 139
If a sufficiently high percentage of the market is joined, then dis-
tortion from this factor will be minimal. At the same time, however,
imposing a high percentage requirement in asbestos litigation may pre-
clude application of the market share theory. As indicated, some of the
major manufacturers have filed petitions to reorganize under the bank-
ruptcy code.140 These manufacturers may no longer be amenable to
suit, and thus it may be impossible to join the requisite percentage of
the market. Hence, at the same time that a plaintiff's need to rely on
the market share theory has increased as a result of his inability to
identify defendants, use of the theory may be foreclosed.
A third distorting factor is that if only a few jurisdictions accept
the theory of market share liability, then some liability will settle by
chance upon the manufacturers that can be sued in those states.' 4 '
Most courts considering the issue have rejected the application of mar-
ket share theory in DES suits,142 and many courts have responded simi-
136. Comment, Refining Market Share Liability. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 33
STAN. L. REV. 937, 942 (1981).
137. Id.
138. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1623, 1645 (1981); Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L.
REV. 695, 721 (1981).
139. Fischer, supra note 138, at 1647. The FORDHAM LAW REVIEW Comment that influ-
enced Sindell proposed the joinder of 75-80% of the manufacturers in the market. Com-
ment, supra note 120, at 996. The Sindell court rejected this figure as too high, and held that
"only a substantial percentage is required." Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at
612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
It might be argued that distortion will be minimized because defendants are free to
bring in third-party defendants by cross-complaint. However, many defendants may not be
amenable to suit in the state where plaintiff files suit. Note, supra note 138, at 721-22.
140. See supra notes 127-28 & accompanying text.
141. Fischer, supra note 138, at 1647-48.
142. See Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593, 599-600 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514
F. Supp. 1004, 1018 (D.S.C. 1981); Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.R.D. 332 (D.D.C. 1982);
Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 181 (1982).
[Vol. 34
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
larly in asbestos cases.' 43
To summarize, market share liability should not be applied in as-
bestos litigation because it is probably impossible to devise a market
share formula that would apportion damages proximate with fault.
Applying the theory would distort the manufacturer's actual liability to
an unacceptable degree. The result of not applying the theory, how-
ever, is that a plaintiff who is unable to identify the manufacturer who
produced the asbestos to which he was exposed will be unable to re-
cover, because he has failed to establish causation.
Government Contract Defense
Another obstacle that asbestos plaintiffs might face at trial is the
government contract defense. This defense is premised on the idea that
the manufacturer or supplier of a product should not be held liable for
injuries caused by the product if the product was manufactured pursu-
ant to government specifications. 44 The government contract defense,
which has been recognized by courts for many years, 145 recently has
been raised by manufacturers who supplied insulation products to na-
val shipyards during World War 1I.146
The United States Navy has used asbestos as a thermal insulating
material in Navy ships since the mid-1930's. The major application has
been as insulation casing around steam boilers and as insulating lag-
ging wrapped around propulsion plant components and steam and hot
water piping.' 47 During World War II, approximately 4.5 million men
and women worked in shipyards in the United States, many of them
under conditions in which exposure to this asbestos insulation was pos-
sible.' 48 Thousands of these employees have contracted asbestos-re-
143. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Starling v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Prelick v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Garcia v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 81-649-
CIV-T-GC (M.D. Fla., filed Aug. 28, 1981). But see Herbeck v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
No. SA-80-CA-520 (W.D. Tex., filed Feb. 23, 1982); Burke v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. C-
1-81-289 (S.D. Ohio, fied Oct. 27, 1981); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
144. AsBESTOs LiIG. RPTR. 4,800 (Apr. 9, 1982).
145. See generally Note, Liability of a Manufacturerfor Products Defectively Designed by
the Government, 23 B.C.L. Rv. 1025 (1982).
146. AsBESTOs LING. RprR. 4,800 (Apr. 9, 1982).
147. 1978 Hearings, supra note 115, at 530 (statement of Capt. J.C. McArthur, U.S.
Navy Commander, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard). In recent years the Navy has shifted to
asbestos-free substitute materials for thermal insulation products. Id. at 531.
148. Selikoff & Hammond, Asbestos-associated Disease in United States Shpyards, 28
CA.-A CANCER JOURNAL FOR CLINICIANS 87, 89 (1978). After World War II the total
number of shipyard workers rapidly decreased from a high of 1.7 million in the last months
of 1943 to 200,000 or so. Total shipyard employment remained in this range from 1946 to
1976. Id.
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lated diseases and have filed suit against the manufacturers that
supplied the insulation products they worked with.149 Manufacturers
have asserted the government contract defense on the basis that asbes-
tos insulation products were purchased by shipyards for use in naval
vessels in accordance with specifications promulgated by the
government. 150
The defense has been accorded a mixed reception by the courts.
In one case the court rejected the defense on the basis that, although
the government was aware of the hazards of the asbestos that was sup-
plied to it, the manufacturer never sought to inform the government or
the exposed workers of such hazards.15' This reasoning is inconsistent
with the accepted formulation of the defense, which provides that a
defendant will be excused from liability if it proves: (1) that the prod-
uct was produced pursuant to a contract; (2) that the government estab-
lished the specifications for the product; (3) that the product
manufactured by the defendant met the government's specifications in
all material respects; and (4) that the government knew as much as or
more than the defendant about the hazards that accompanied use of
the product. 52
In another case the court rejected the defense on the basis that
defendant's insulation products, although in compliance with govern-
ment specifications, were sold to private entities as well as to the gov-
ernment.' 53 This fact, however, should be irrelevant to a determination
of the applicability of the defense, because the insulation that caused
the shipyard injuries would not have been present at the shipyards if
149. See ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 5,522 (Sept. 10, 1982); id. at 5,417 (Aug. 27, 1982).
150. See Rivkin, The Government Contract Defense: A Proposalfor the Expeditious Reso-
lution ofAsbestos Litigation, 17 FORUM 1225, 1238 (1982); see also 1982 Hearings, supra note
27, at 254-55 (statement of Victor L. Drexel, Corporate Counsel, Amatex Corp.).
151. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1040, 435
N.E.2d 540, 546 (1982).
152. This formulation of the defense was first propounded by the federal district court
hearing the Agent Orange class action suit. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Agent Orange, the preferred herbicide
of the United States for use in South Vietnam, was produced pursuant to government speci-
fications. United States military personnel exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam have
brought suit against the manufacturers of the herbicide for injuries allegedly suffered as a
result of their exposure. The manufacturers have asserted the government contract defense.
See generally Comment, Agent Orange as a Problem ofLaw and Policy, 77 Nw. U.L. REv.
48 (1982). The Agent Orange court's formulation of the government contract defense has
been accepted by several asbestos courts. See Tefft v. A. C. & S., Inc., Nos. C80-924M, C81-
179M, C81-533M (W.D. Wash., filed Sept. 15, 1982); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F.
Supp. 1142, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
153. Chapin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. S79-0272 (N) (S.D. Miss., filed Jan. 27,
1982).
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the government had not required it.' 54
Where the government contract defense is unavailable, defendants
may be found liable, and they also may encounter significant hurdles to
obtaining indemnity or contribution from the government. In a group
of Virginia shipyard cases,' 55 manufacturers of asbestos products
sought indemnity from the government on the theory that, as between
active and passive tortfeasors, the latter are entitled to indemnity from
the former. The Fourth Circuit, applying maritime law, 5 6 denied re-
covery on the basis that the manufacturers, if found liable on the main
claims (liability being a predicate to indemnity), would be active
tortfeasors, since a finding of liability would mean that the manufactur-
ers had proximately caused the workers' injuries. 57 Attempts in other
asbestos cases to obtain indemnity or contribution from the govern-
ment also have been unsuccessful.15 8
154. See Tefft v. A.C. & S., Inc., Nos. C80-924M, C81-179M, C81-533M (W.D. Wash.,
ified Sept. 15, 1982) (defense applies irrespective of the product's general application).
155. Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981); White v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); White v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1981).
156. At the time of the Fourth Circuit decisions, maritime law recognized the active-
passive rule. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit held that the adoption of comparative negli-
gence in maritime law abrogated this rule. See Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d
493 (5th Cir. 1982).
The Fourth Circuit's holding that the claims of shipyard insulation workers are cogni-
zable in admiralty has been rejected by the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits. See Austin v.
UNARCO Indus., Inc., No. 82-1168 (1st Cir., filed Mar. 30, 1983); Keene Corp. v. United
States, 700 F.2d 836, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1983); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United States District
Court, 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Jacobowitz v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 79 C
865 (E.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 28, 1982).
157. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243,249-50 (4th Cir. 1981). A contractual
claim for indemnity (based on a theoretical reverse implied warranty running from the ship-
yard to the manufacturers) also was unsuccessful. See id. at 248. Cf. In re General Dynam-
ics Asbestos Cases, 539 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Conn. 1982) (unsuccessful combination of
government contract defense with reverse implied warranty argument).
158. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissing for
want of subject matter jurisdiction Keene's complaint for contribution or indemnity from
the United States). The government also may be insulated against claims for indemnity by
virtue of the exclusive remedy clauses, see supra notes 49-50 & accompanying text, of the
Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976) and the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976). At least
13,000 administrative claims for asbestos-related disease have been brought under the
FECA. AsBEsTos LrrIG. RPT. 4,863 (Apr. 23, 1982). In Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v.
United States, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970), the court
allowed a tortfeasor to seek indemnity from the United States despite the exclusive remedy
clause of the FECA. However, the analysis used in Bremen has been rejected by the other
circuits. See, e.g., Thomas v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 665 F.2d 1330, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
rev'd sub nom. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1033 (1983).
In Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1981), a case involving
the FECA, the court assumed, without deciding, that § 8116(c) was inapplicable, on the
basis ofBremen. The court's tort-based indemnity ruling in White v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
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To summarize, the United States government contributed to the
asbestos problem by specifying that asbestos insulation be used aboard
naval vessels during World War II and the Korean War. The govern-
ment contract defense ought to be available to defendant manufactur-
ers in asbestos suits, but where the defense is successful it will act as a
complete bar to liability, 159 and victims will go uncompensated. Where
the defense is unavailable, the manufacturers may be found liable, and
they also may be denied indemnity or contribution from the govern-
ment. In either case the government avoids tort liability. 60
Efficiency and Collateral Estoppel
Thousands and thousands of pending asbestos suits have created a
tremendous burden on the courts.' 6' It has been suggested that apply-
ing the doctrine of collateral estoppel could dramatically reduce this
burden.162 For a number of reasons, however, collateral estoppel has
only limited potential for application to asbestos litigation.
Collateral estoppel precludes litigation of identical issues in differ-
ent suits. Only issues actually litigated and essential to a valid and final
judgment are subject to collateral estoppel.163 Traditionally, an addi-
662 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1981), made it unnecessary to decide whether Bremen applied in that
case to the exclusive remedy clause of the applicable statute, the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act.
159. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). Because the defense, if successful, is a complete bar to liability, it has been
suggested that federal courts should exercise their power to sever trials and hear the defense
first, as a matter of judicial economy. See Rivkin, supra note 150, at 1237-38. Asbestos
courts have not been uniformly responsive to this suggestion. Compare Tefft v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., Nos. C80-924M, C81-179M, C81-533M (W.D. Wash., filed Sept. 15, 1982) (granting
Phase I trial) with Zeserman v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., No. 81-1295 (E.D. Pa., filed Mar.
23, 1983) (denying Phase I trial). Phase I motions are pending in Maine and Connecticut.
ASBESTos LiTiG. RPTR. 6,459 (Apr. 8, 1983).
160. In addition to its potential liability under the FECA, the United States is a defend-
ant in approximately 1,000 suits brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976) (for injuries resulting from asbestos exposure). ASBESTOS LI-
TIG. RPTR. 4,863 (Apr. 23, 1982). However, these claims have not been particularly success-
ful. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 178 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (claim of asbestos
plaintiff under FTCA barred because government's decision to sell asbestos fell within dis-
cretionary function exception to the Act).
161. For example, in the Eastern District of Texas, pending asbestos suits account for
more than 15% of the total case load. ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 5,220 (July 23, 1982). More-
over, because of the long latency periods of asbestos-related diseases, pending cases may
very well represent "only the leading edge of the storm." Smith & Channon, supra note 34,
at 142.
162. Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
55, 85 (1978).
163. IB J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441[2] (2d ed. 1982).
Collateral estoppel is to be distinguished from the related doctrine of res judicata, under
which a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties
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tional requirement for the application of estoppel was mutuality of par-
ties. Under the mutuality doctrine, neither party could use a prior
judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were
bound by the judgment. 64
Mutuality was abandoned in California in 1942,165 and a number
of jurisdictions have followed suit.166 In Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore,167 the United States Supreme Court abandoned the requirement
of mutuality for cases involving the "offensive use" of collateral estop-
pel. Offensive use occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the de-
fendant from litigating an issue the defendant previously has litigated
unsuccessfully in an action with another party. 168
Parklane replaced the federal rule of mutuality with one that
grants trial courts broad discretion to determine the applicability of of-
fensive collateral estoppel. This discretion is bound only by the express
limitation that when the application of offensive estoppel would be un-
fair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow its use.169
A number of asbestos suits already have been tried to conclusion.
Many of these suits, including the leading cases of Bore! v. Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. 170 and Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp. ,171 have resulted in judgments against various manufacturers of
asbestos products. Plaintiffs in subsequent suits have argued that these
manufacturers should be estopped from relitigating issues decided in
Borel and Karjala 172
Much of the asbestos litigation is taking place in federal courts, on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. A threshold issue, therefore, is
or their privies based on the same cause of action. See id; see also Carbonaro v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (res judicata bars federal action involving
colon cancer after unsuccessful state action involving asbestosis).
164. lB J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, supra note 163, 0.412[l]. The asserted rationale for
the mutuality doctrine was that it was unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment when
he himself would not be bound by it. See Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Join-
der of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457, 1468-71 (1968).
165. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942).
166. See Note, Collateral Estoppel- The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo.
L. REv. 521, 544 (1976).
167. 439 U.S. 322 (1976).
168. Id. at 326 nA. "Defensive use occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff
from asserting a claim the plaintiff previously has litigated and lost against another defend-
ant." Id. Eight years prior to Parklane, the United States Supreme Court had allowed the
use of nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel in a patent invalidity case. See Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
169. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 331.
170. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
171. 523 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1975).
172. See, eg., Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn.
1982).
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whether a federal court sitting in diversity should apply the Parklane
rule of collateral estoppel, or instead should follow the law of the j uris-
diction in which it sits. This issue is of some importance, because only
a slight majority of states has rejected the mutuality requirement. 73
The importance of the issue has not always been matched by care-
ful judicial analysis. One federal district court held that state law con-
trols, but did not discuss the problem. 174 A second district court
justified its reliance on state law in part on the basis of a dictum by that
circuit's court of appeals which subsequently was repudiated by the ap-
pellate court.17 5
One reason to apply the Parklane rule in diversity actions is that if
the rule is not applied, the integrity of federal court judgments may be
undermined. A supervening interpretation of the state law of collateral
estoppel could result in the relitigation of issues that otherwise would
have been finally decided. A second reason to apply Parklane is that it
is important to maintain uniformity in the federal judicial system.
These arguments seem persuasive,1 76 but because some asbestos courts
continue to reject this view 177 the applicability of estoppel is accord-
ingly limited.
A second limitation on the application of estoppel in asbestos liti-
gation is that Parklane, while it abandoned the requirement of mutual-
173. Note, Nonmutualiy: Taking the Fairness Out of Collateral Estoppel, 13 IND. L.
REV. 563, 566-67 (1980).
174. Miller v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 538 F. Supp. 631, 632 (D. Kan. 1982).
175. McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
The dictum appears in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 717 n.8 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Metropolitan Dade County v. Aerojet-General Corp., 423 U.S. 908
(1975). Aerojet is the leading case holding that the federal law of res judicata applies in
federal diversity actions. Aerojet's conclusion that a different result should obtain in cases of
collateral estoppel has been rejected by all other Fifth Circuit courts. See, e.g., Hardy v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1982); Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 839 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp.
242, 245 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
176. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 reporter's note b
(1982), the "better reasoned" view is that Parklane does apply in federal diversity actions.
Two other situations are to be distinguished. Where the claims or defenses in question in
the second action are governed by federal substantive law, federal law also controls the
question whether such claims or defenses are barred by res judicata, even if the first suit was
brought in state court. IA (Part 2) J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 0.311[2] (2d ed. 1982). Where the first action was brought in
state court and did not involve federal matters, the federal district court is required to follow
the res judicata law of the forum state. Id. Presumably both of these rules also apply in
cases of collateral estoppel.
177. See Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1384, 1385 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Maloney v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. C79-167 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 26, 1982). In
Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 542 n.3 (D. Minn. 1982), the court
found it unnecessary to resolve the issue because the state and federal law were "essentially
identical."
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ity, left undisturbed the requirement of privity.178 Thus manufacturers
who were not parties or privies to prior federal decisions such as Borel
cannot be estopped by those decisions in subsequent federal diversity
actions. It might be argued that privity exists because all of the manu-
facturers have similar legal positions, but it has been held that estoppel
based on similarity of interests violates the due process rights of
defendants. 179
A third limitation on the application of estoppel relates to Park-
lane's holding that offensive use may be allowed only when it would
not be unfair to a defendant. The Supreme Court gave as one example
of unfairness the situation in which "the judgment relied upon as a
basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous
judgments in favor of the defendant."'180
Of the one hundred and eighty-five asbestos trials concluded by
February 1983, ninety resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts and fifty-one re-
sulted in defendants' verdicts.1 81 This statistic alone does not indicate
that juries have found that asbestos is not an unreasonably dangerous
product for purposes of strict liability, since the cases have been sub-
mitted to juries for general verdicts rather than for special verdicts.182
But even if an inconsistent verdict has not yet been returned, it is likely
that such a verdict eventually will be returned, because not all exposure
to asbestos causes disease. In fact, virtually everyone living in an in-
dustrial community has some asbestos in his or her lungs, 8 3 while the
incidence of asbestos-related disease in the general population is virtu-
ally nil.' 8 4 The result of an inconsistent verdict, according to Parklane,
is that application of estoppel would be unfair, and thus may not be
allowed.
The Supreme Court also observed in Parklane that it would be
unfair to apply estoppel "if a defendant in the first action is sued for
small or nominal damages [since] he may have little incentive to defend
vigorously, particularly if future lawsuits are not foreseeable."'' 85 The
178. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 332.
179. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1982). See also
Comment, supra note 2, at 1333 & n.124.
180. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 330. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 29(4) (1982).
181. ASBESTOS LInG. RPTR. 6,252 (Feb. 25, 1983). Thirty-eight cases were settled dur-
ing trial, there were three mistrials, and two verdicts were too complex to classify. Id.
182. See Amader v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1033, 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 542 (D. Minn. 1982).
183. R. George, R. Light & R. Matthay, supra note 6, at 380; Churg & Warnock, Asbes-
tos Fibers in the General Population, 122 AM. REV. REsp. Dis. 669 (1980).
184. See, e.g., H. HiNSHAW & J. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 730 (there is no evidence of
an increased incidence of mesothelioma due to random exposure to asbestos).
185. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 330.
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plaintiff in Borel recovered $68,000 in 1973.186 While $68,000 is not a
nominal sum, standing alone or in comparison to the $82,000 average
award in asbestos trials to date, 87 the Borel award is nominal in com-
parison to the total amount of liability that the Borel defendants face
now, and will face in future years. Similarly, while it might be argued
that in 1973 future suits were foreseeable, since the Borel defendants
were aware that other workers had been exposed to asbestos and might
develop asbestos-related diseases, arguably the present tremendous vol-
ume of asbestos litigation was neither foreseeable nor foreseen. 88
In addition to refusing to estop litigation concerning the unreason-
ably dangerous nature of asbestos products, several courts also have
refused to estop litigation on the issue of whether asbestos exposure can
cause mesothelioma or asbestosis. 189 One reason given for this position
is that defendants ought to be free to present state of the art evidence
relating to their particular products. 190 Such an approach is untenable.
While the medical community is divided on some aspects of the various
asbestos-related diseases, all authorities agree that asbestos can cause
these diseases. One court that refused to estop the use of state of the art
evidence held: "It is clear that it is appropriate to estop litigation on
the issue of whether asbestos dust can cause diseases such as asbestosis
and mesothelioma. This proposition is so firmly entrenched in the
medical and legal literature that it is not subject to serious dispute."'19'
In summary, collateral estoppel is not a viable mechanism for con-
serving scarce judicial resources in asbestos suits. This is because:
(1) some courts have declined to follow the better reasoned view that
Parklane should apply in diversity actions, which means that mutuality
may be required; (2) privity does not always exist; (3) inconsistent ver-
186. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
187. See ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 4,972 (May 28, 1982).
188. But see Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
("The court is convinced that the estoppel effect of the Borel judgment was foreseeable to
Johns-Manville .... ").
189. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 347-48 (5th Cir. 1982);
Miller v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 538 F. Supp. 631, 634-35 (D. Kan. 1982); McCarty v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
190. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 347 (5th Cir. 1982). For a
similar reason the Hardy court refused to take judicial notice of the fact that asbestos causes
cancer. Id. at 348. See also Erlenbach, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and Products Liability.-
Reasoning with the Unreasonable, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 19, 46 (1982) (Hardy decision has
effectively made collateral estoppel in asbestos cases a dead letter).
191. Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1982). Of
course, the fact that asbestos can cause these diseases does not necessarily mean that it did
cause them in a particular case. Thus, estopping litigation on this issue still would leave to
be tried the issue of whether the plaintiffs exposure was sufficiently great to have caused his
alleged condition of asbestosis or mesothelioma. See Baldwin, Asbestos Litigation and Col-
lateral Estoppel, 17 FORUM 772, 781-82 (1982).
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dicts almost inevitably will result, which means that fairness considera-
tions militate against estoppel; and (4) some courts refuse to estop
litigation of the issue of whether asbestos can cause diseases. The net
result is that the parties are forced to relitigate the asbestos liability
wheel in each asbestos suit that goes to trial, and millions of dollars
that otherwise might have gone to asbestos victims are consumed by
attorneys' fees and related legal expenses. 192 This inefficiency of the
status quo is the final reason for adopting a federal compensation law.
The Legislative Response
The United States Congress is very much aware of the asbestos
problem. Two key bills addressed to the problem have been intro-
duced. In the 98th Congress, Representative George Miller introduced
the Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983.19 3 Previously in
the 97th Congress, Senator Gary Hart introduced the Asbestos Health
Hazards Compensation Act of 1981.194
The Senate bill would make existing workers' compensation pro-
grams the exclusive remedy for injured asbestos workers against their
employers and the manufacturers of asbestos products. 195 It also would
ensure that compensation under these programs would be adequate, by
establishing federal minimum standards. The minimum recovery for
total disability or death due to an asbestos-related disease would be
66.667 percent of the average gross weekly wage of the claimant for the
highest three of the five years immediately preceding the beginning of
the disability or prior to death, 196 and this figure increases if the claim-
ant has dependents.' 9 7 Since less than half of the states presently pro-
vide for weekly death benefits at the rate of 66.667 percent of wages, 198
benefits would increase significantly. The amount of the increase
would vary from state to state, but according to one study average wage
replacement rates would double from forty percent now to eighty per-
192. It typically costs defendants $150,000 to put $28,000 in the hands of a successful
claimant. ASBESTOS LITIG. RPTR. 5,320 (Aug. 13, 1982). That is, 80 to 90 cents of every
dollar spent in asbestos litigation is consumed by attorneys' fees and related legal expenses.
Id. at 5,176 (Oct. 22, 1982). But cf id. at 4,679 (Mdr. 12, 1982) (for every 6 cents that is paid
to an asbestos victim, 7 cents is paid to an attorney involved in the litigation); id. at 5,903
(Dec. 10, 1982) (over the next 3 decades defense costs will be $25 to $30 billion to pay for
$38 billion in asbestos claims).
193. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
194. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). As this Comment went to press, Senator Hart
had not yet re-introducted his bill in the 98th Congress.
195. Id. § 10(a).
196. Id. § 4(a)(3).
197. Id. § 4(a)(5).
198. 1979 Hearings, supra note 12, at 166 (statement of Sheldon W. Samuels). But see
1982 Hearings, supra note 27, at 486 (statement of Robin Obetz) (state wage replacement
rates of 2/3 or greater are standard).
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cent under the proposed federal minimum standard.1 99
Similarly, the Senate bill would establish a minimum wage re-
placement standard of 66.667 percent for partial disabilities caused by
exposure to asbestos. 2°° This standard is to be contrasted with the pres-
ent practice of many states of omitting or qualifying benefits for such
disabilities.2 01  Of equal importance to the partially disabled worker,
the Senate bill would permit reapplication for an increase in benefits if
the disability worsens, 2 2 which is a feature absent from many existing
compensation programs203
The Senate bill also avoids existing barriers to compensation for
asbestos-related disease, including provisions relating to a claimant's
last-injurious-exposure or last date of employment. 204 This is desirable
since, as indicated, last-injurious-exposure rules operate unfairly to bar
claims for asbestos-related disease.205 The bill replaces these rules with
a discovery rule.2°6
Under the Senate bill, compensation programs fully in compliance
with the federal minimum standards would be fully certified by the
Secretary of Labor. To the extent that a program was not in full com-
pliance, a claimant would be entitled to supplemental compensation.207
A worker's last employer would be required to pay compensation, but
that employer would be entitled to reimbursement from other responsi-
ble parties. 208 A particular formula for allocating liability would be
devised by a newly-created Apportionment Criteria Commission.209
The House bill would make compensation from a national Toxic
Substance Employee Compensation Insurance Pool the exclusive rem-
edy for injured asbestos workers against their employers.210 This Pool
would be funded by employers which exposed workers to asbestos, and
by enterprises involved at any stage in the commercial or industrial
production of asbestos. The proportion of funding to be provided by
the two groups would be determined primarily on the basis of the pro-
portion of workers' compensation payments made to liability payments
made during a representative period prior to the effective date of the
Act.21 1
199. 1982 Hearings, supra note 27, at 474 (statement of Prof. William G. Johnson).
200. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(4) (1981).
201. See supra notes 44-45 & accompanying text.
202. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(16) (1981).
203. See supra note 46 & accompanying text.
204. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(10) (1981).
205. See supra notes 33-34 & accompanying text.
206. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(15) (1981).
207. Id. § 5(b).
208. Id. § 7.
209. Id. § 8.
210. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 10(a), (11) (1983).
211. Id. § 1l(c)(3)(A).
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Individual employers and commercial enterprises would contrib-
ute to the Pool according to multi-factor formulas. For example, asbes-
tos enterprises would contribute based on a market-share formula
which takes into account the relative asbestos content of the enter-
prise's products, the risk posed by the products, and the enterprise's
prior asbestos litigation experience.21 2 Non-contributing enterprises
would be subject to civil actions brought by the Secretary of Labor, as
well as to civil penalties. 213 The total amount of funds in the Pool
would be determined annually by the Secretary on the basis of the past
experience of the Pool, anticipated obligations, and actuarial
projections. 214
Claims for compensation from the Pool would be filed with ex-
isting federal Offices of Workers' Compensation Programs.215 Barriers
to compensation such as last-injurious-exposure and minimum-expo-
sure rules would be replaced with a discovery rule.216 Compensation
from the Pool would be provided in accordance with specified federal
standards. The wage replacement standard for total disability would
be eighty percent of the national manufacturing average weekly wage
for the month in which the onset of the disability occurred, or eighty
percent of the national average construction wage for asbestos workers
injured in the construction industry.217 The standard for partial disa-
bility in workers who are still employed would be 66.667 percent of the
differences between the employee's average weekly wage during the
year immediately prior to the onset of the disabling condition and the
employee's average weekly wage after such onset.218
The House bill, introduced in May 1983 as the carefully revised
version of an earlier draft219 on which hearings were held,2 0 is superior
to the Senate bill in several respects. First, by establishing a national
compensation pool rather than relying on ex-isting state compensation
programs, the House bill probably makes it more likely that adequate
compensation will be provided to asbestos victims. Second, the House
bill is much more specific than the Senate bill in key areas. For exam-
ple, the Senate bill provides very little guidance to the Apportionment
Criteria Commission in devising a formula to allocate liability, while
the House bill specifies the apportionment factors to be taken into
212. Id. § 11(c)(3)(B).
213. Id. §§ 11(f)(1)-(2).
214. Id. § 11(c)(1).
215. Id. § 7(a).
216. Id. §§ 7(b)(3), (c).
217. Id. § 5(b).
218. Id. § 5(d)(l)(B).
219. The earlier draft of the House bill was the Occupational Health Hazards Compen-
sation Act of 1982, H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
220. 1982 Hearings, supra note 27.
ASBESTOS LITIGATIONMarch 1983]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
consideration.22'
Third, the House bill's discovery rule is superior to the Senate ver-
sion of the same rule. Under the latter, a claim for benfits must be filed
within three years after death or an initial medical determination of
total disability due to an asbestos-related disease, whichever occurs
first.22 2 Thus, the claims period could begin to run on a medical deter-
mination of disability, even if the claimant has no reason to know of
the diagnosis of his disease. In contrast, under the House bill, the
claims period does not begin to run until the claimant knows or should
know of the relationship between the disease and workplace exposure
to asbestos. 223
Finally, the House bill, unlike the Senate bill, avoids the place-
ment of liability on a workers' last employer, by providing that all pay-
ments will be made by the Pool. As indicated, it is inequitable to assign
liability to a last employer without regard to whether previous employ-
ments contributed to a claimant's disease.224 The Senate bill's initial
assignment of liability to the last employer (who is eligible to seek re-
imbursement) 225 does not represent much of an improvement over the
status quo.
The Senate bill, however, is superior to the House bill in several
key respects. First and foremost, the former, unlike the latter, provides
for the allocation of liability to the United States. Among the factors
the Senate bill's Apportionment Criteria Commission is directed to
consider is "the party or parties responsible for establishing the criteria
to which product specifications were designed and products were man-
ufactured. ' 226 This provision clearly encompasses insulation products
purchased by shipyards for use aboard naval vessels. While the Senate
bill requires the federal government "to make contributions in propor-
tion to its share of responsibility, ' 22 7 the House bill specifically ex-
cludes the United States from participation in the Pool.228 Thus only
the Senate bill helps to rectify the failure of the status quo to assign
liability to all responsible parties. 229
Second, the Senate bill, unlike the House bill, avoids the use of
221. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ l1(c)(3)(A)-(C) (1983).
222. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(15) (1981).
223. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b)(3) (1983).
224. See supra notes 60-63 & accompanying text.
225. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1981).
226. Id. § 8(c)(3).
227. Id. § 9(c)(2).
228. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(6), (17) (1983).
229. The Senate bill, however, only partially corrects the inequities of the status quo.
There is good reason, considering that cigarettes are co-carcinogenic with asbestos in the
induction of lung cancer, see supra note 135, to require the tobacco industry to make some
contribution to asbestos victims. Neither the Senate bill nor the House bill provides for such
contribution.
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presumptions in determining a claimant's eligibility for compensa-
tion.23o The use of presumptions has been one of the most criticized
features of the Black Lung Benefits Act;23' their use under that Act has
resulted in the compensation of undeserving claimants.232 The House
bill's presumptions could produce similar results.233 Finally, the Sen-
ate bill, unlike the House bill, provides for the compensation of mem-
bers of the households of asbestos workers, members who themselves
become disabled by virtue of coming into contact with exposed work-
ers.234 This provision is important because the incidence of asbestos-
related disease in the household contacts of asbestos workers is not
insignificant. 235
230. The Senate bill provides: "In no event shall there be any presumption of asbestos-
related disease based solely on the length or degree of exposure to asbestos." S. 1643, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(a)(17) (1981). In contrast, the House bill establishes irrebutable pre-
sumptions that mesothelioma and asbestosis resulted from exposure to asbestos if the claim-
ant shows that the injured employee was exposed to asbestos in the course of employment.
See H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(c)(l)-(2) (1983). In the case of lung cancer, the
presumption is rebuttable, unless radiological or histological evidence of asbestotic changes
to the lung or pleura is produced. Id. § 6(c)(3).
231. The original federal black lung legislation, passed as title IV of the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941 (1976), has been amended twice
and is now referred to as the Black Lung Benefits Act. Strader & Sheehe, Federal Black
Lung. Ten Years of Legislation and Litigation, 16 FORUM 525, 525 n.3 (1981).
232. A study conducted by the General Accounting Office concluded that 88.5% of
claims for black lung compensation are approved solely because of statutory presumptions;
in these cases medical evidence was inadequate to establish disability or death from black
lung. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 27, at 484 (statement of Robin Obetz). See also Solo-
mons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black Lung Interim Pre-
sumption andA Survey of its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 869, 915 (1980).
233. For example, exposure to asbestos is not the only known cause of mesothelioma. In
southern Turkey, endemic mesothelioma has been related to zeolites, which like asbestos are
fibrous hydrated silicates. Baris, Artvinli & Sakin, Environmental Mesothelioma in Turkey,
330 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 423 (1979); Kannerstein & Churg, Mesothelioma in Man and
Experimental Animals, 34 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 31, 31 (1980).
Various recent studies show no evidence of asbestos exposure in 15% of patients with
mesothelioma. W. PARKES, supra note 10, at 277. See also R. George, R. Light & R.
Matthay, supra note 6, at 530 (only half of mesothelioma patients have a documented his-
tory of asbestos exposure); Newhouse, supra note 11, at 253 ("No contact with asbestos can
be traced in approximately 30% of the patients with mesothelioma.. . . [I]t must be ac-
cepted that mesotheliomas are not invariably related to asbestos exposure."). But see Craig-head, Abraham & Pratt, supra note 135, at 584 ("Malignant mesotheliomas of the pleura
and peritoneum either are exceptionally rare or never occur in patients not exposed to asbes-
tos.").
The House bill's presumption as to lung cancer is even more problematic, considering
the relationship between smoking, asbestos and lung cancer. See supra note 135.
234. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(4)(B), 3 (1981).
235. One study found that 10% of shipyard workers' wives had asbestosis. Schechter,
supra note 5, at 30-31. It also has been estimated that after 20 years of exposure to asbestos
workers the death rate among family contacts from mesothelioma is 1% and after 30 years it
is 2%. Hazards of Asbestos Exposure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trans-
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One possible argument against passage of either bill is that each
represents a "bail-out" of the asbestos industry, inasmuch as the exclu-
sivity clauses in the bills prohibit third-party suits. However, as indi-
cated, the asbestos industry probably was unaware of the hazards to
insulation workers prior to the time that the industry began issuing
warnings.236 Thus, the bills do not reward the industry for past omis-
sions. Moreover, the industry does not escape liability under the pro-
posed legislation, since even manufacturers who filed chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions are required to contribute to the House bill's
Pool.237
Even if the bills do represent a bail-out, the interests of injured
asbestos workers still are best served by replacing inadequate tort com-
pensation with workers' compensation benefits at specified minimum
levels. Tort compensation is inadequate because, as indicated, plain-
tiffs may be barred by inequitable statutes of limitations,238 or where
the state of the art239 or government contract defenses24° are allowed,
or where they are unable to establish causation by identifying the par-
ticular manufacturers who produced the asbestos to which they were
exposed.241
Where plaintiffs have been able to surmount these obstacles, the
amounts recovered frequently have been inadequate. On average, suc-
cessful claimants receive approximately $80,000,242 but this figure is in-
flated by several very large awards,243 and much of the money is used
to cover legal expenses.244 Indeed, a leading union of asbestos insula-
tors has concluded that third-party litigation "is a hit or miss system
which [does not serve] the interests of asbestos workers .... Litiga-
tion is not the answer." 245
A second possible argument against the bills is that Congress
should not enact legislation concerning specific diseases, since such an
approach fragments occupational disease benefit systems. However, in
the absence of federal minimum standards applicable to compensation
for all occupational diseases, asbestos-related diseases merit special
portation, and Tourism of the House Comrm on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
30 (1982) (statement of Prof. William Nicholson). Lung cancer rates among family contacts
are double that for mesothelioma. 1982 Hearings, supra note 27, at 75 (statement of Dr.
Irving J. Selikoff).
236. See supra notes 110-15 & accompanying text.
237. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § ll(f)(3)(B)(i) (1983).
238. See supra notes 64-89 & accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 90-109 & accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 144-60 & accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 116-43 & accompanying text.
242. ASBESTOS LITIG. RPrR. 4,972 (May 28, 1982).
243. 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 228 (statement of Laurence J. Cohen).
244. See supra note 192.
245. 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 228 (statement of Laurence J. Cohen).
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treatment by virtue of the sheer numbers of workers involved. Addi-
tionally, the Senate bill is designed to be a model program for the en-
actment of federal minimum standards for workers' compensation
coverage of all occupational diseases 246 and the House bill contem-
plates that the Pool will provide compensation to workers who suffer
death or disability due to occupational exposure to toxic substances
other than asbestos. 247
A final argument against the bills is that they may be expensive or
cumbersome to administer. However, only a minimal amount of new
federal machinery is called for by the bills, since existing workers' com-
pensation programs remain the vehicle for providing benefits.248 Also,
at least under the House bill, administrative funds would be provided
by the Pool,249 rather than by the federal government. Finally, since
the federal government is in large part responsible for the asbestos
problem, it ought to assume an active role in resolving it.
Conclusion
Millions of American workers have been exposed to asbestos, and
thousands of these workers are dead or dying. These workers and their
survivors are denied adequate compensation under presently available
remedial systems. These systems also fail to assign liability to all re-
sponsible parties, and they fail to operate efficiently.
The only solution to the national problem of asbestos-related dis-
ease is the enactment of a federal compensation law that would both
establish minimum standards for workers' compensation programs and
make these programs the exclusive remedy for asbestos claimants.
Both the Senate and the House bills would accomplish these objectives,
but each is superior to the other in certain respects. A compromise bill
should be enacted.
Gideon Mark*
246. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(a)(9)(1981).
247. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1983).
248. For example, under both bills appeals of compensation awards would be made to
the existing Benefits Review Board, established pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Habor
Worker's Compensation Act. See S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a)(1) (1981); H.R. 3175,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(b) (1983).
249. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(h) (1983).
* Member, Third Year Class.
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